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ECONOMIC UNION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUE
RICHARD

B. COLLINS*

Professor Collins presents an in-depth defense of the dormant commerce power doctrine He maintainsthat the text of the commerce clause, the original intent behind it,
and a century of congressionalacquiescence to broadjudicial enforcement of the dormant commerce power lend sufficient legitimacy to the doctrine to support its continued existence After examining the textual and historical bases for the doctrine,
Professor Collins concludes that the primary purpose behind the commerce clause is
the promotion of economic integrationand interstateharmony. Based upon his discussion of the doctrine'sorigins and development, he contends that critics of the doctrine
who would injectpersonalrightsjurisprudenceinto dormant commerce power analysis
are misguided. The doctrine aims at protecting economic union, not personal right
Given this purpose, politicalprocess and legislative motivation theories do not present
compelling casesfor doctrinalchange or abolition. Until challengerscan show that the
Court'spromotion of economic integrationdoes not achieve net political and economic
gains, the doctrine should be employed to achieve those ends.
INTRODUCTION

Since early in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has promoted economic union by invalidating state laws that were hostile to a
national common market. The Court's principal instrument to carry out
this policy has been the commerce clause.1 The Court has defined the
reach of the commerce clause expansively and has broadly read acts of
Congress passed under it, leading to the preemption of state laws. 2 Absent any congressional action, the Court has construed Congress's
"power to regulate commerce in its dormant state" as an important limit
on state regulation. 3 Other judicial policies that promoted economic
4
union include expansive interpretation of the federal admiralty power,
development of a federal common law under Swift v. Tyson, 5 recognition
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A., 1960, Yale University;
LL.B., 1966, Harvard University. I am grateful for helpful advice from my colleagues Robert
Nagel and Charles Wilkinson and my former colleague Judge Stephen Williams and for the
research and editing assistance of Colorado students William Berger, Lindley Heher, and Ted
Swanson.
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power... [to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ... .
2 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-96, 209-22 (1824).
3 See text accompanying notes 25-52 infra. The quoted language is from Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
4 See D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 17891888, at 257-59 (1985).
5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see
D. Currie, supra note 4, at 158-61.
43
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of corporate citizenship in diversity cases, 6 creation of a constitutional
right to travel or migrate interstate, 7 and aggressive enforcement of the
8
contracts clause and of the fourteenth amendment in economic cases.

These decisions, combined with enforcement of more explicit provisions
of articles I, 9 111,10 and IV,11 moved the nation toward economic
integration.
Many of these judicial doctrines were not inexorably commanded by
constitutional text and history and have generated great controversy.1 2
The vision directing the Court is the belief that economic union is a central purpose of the Constitution, and that the judiciary has broad power
to carry out that purpose. Critics, particularly academics, concentrate
their attacks on the latter proposition because it has weaker support in
constitutional text and history.
Constitutional controversy over economic union is not active in the
political arena. Today's political debates over federalism are about judicial enforcement of individual rights and appropriate exercise of congressional powers. 13 But academic criticism continues unabated on one
front: the dormant commerce power doctrine and its expansive influence
on the interpretation of federal commercial statutes. Claims that this
doctrine is illegitimate, mistaken, or misapplied, entirely or in important
14
part, bloom again each law review season.
6 See Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); see also Terral v.
Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (finding that state law forbidding foreign corporations
from suing in federal court violated article III).
7 See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 8.10 (3d ed. 1986).
8 See D. Currie, supra note 4, at 127-59, 203-21; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324, 369-86
(1985).
9 See U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8-10.
10 See id. art. III, §§ 1-2.
11 See id. art. IV, §§ 1-2.
12 The Court itself has rescinded the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and no longer aggressively reviews
economic regulations under the fourteenth amendment. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young,
supra note 7, § 11.4, § 11.8, at 378.
13 One exception to political acceptance of constitutional principles governing economic
union is the Reagan Administration's assault on the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine.
The Administration has limited the circumstances under which executive agencies may construe federal statutes and regulations to preempt state law. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, § 4,
52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987); Working Group on Federalism, The Domestic Policy Council,
The Status of Federalism in America 3, 9, 37-42 (1986). However, both of these policy statements are about preemption in the abstract, without regard to context, commercial or otherwise. In actual commercial cases, the Administration has addressed both preemption and the
dormant commerce power doctrine according to traditional criteria. See, e.g., Brief for the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States as Amici Curiae at 8-10, CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (No. 86-71).
14 Professor Thayer was the first prominent academic to argue that the doctrine is entirely
unjustified. See 2 J. Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law 2090-91 (1895). His view continues
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Contrary to the assertions of its critics, the dormant commerce

power doctrine has a reasonable, though not conclusive, basis in constitutional history. Economic union was unquestionably a principal aim of
the framers. 15 Originally, the issues were the Constitution's allocation of
authority to carry out that purpose and judicial competence to achieve it.
Now that the dormant commerce power doctrine has been applied for

more than a century, an additional concern, frequently neglected in
scholarly discourse, is the value of continuity in the legal order. When a
rule has been so long observed, we should demand good reasons from

those who would discard

it.16

Modem constitutional law's preoccupation with individual rights
has created confusion in discussions of the dormant commerce power
doctrine. Personal rights thinking has infiltrated academic analysis, and

it occasionally appears in the Court's opinions. 17 Two features of dormant commerce power cases encourage this rights-based perspective:
most enforcement actions are brought by merchants seeking personal advantage, and the Court's opinions deploy that elusive talisman of modern

constitutional law, discrimination.
Academic revisions of the dormant commerce power doctrine follow two lines of argument. One advocates recasting the doctrine from a
method of promoting economic union into an instrument for safeguarding the personal rights of nonresident merchants under the political process theory of judicial review.1 8 The other seeks to engraft on to the
to have adherents. See, e.g., D. Currie, supra note 4, at 342 ("In doctrinal terms the Court's
efforts in this field can be described only as a disaster."); Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 71, 78-80 (1980)
(arguing that Court's doctrine rests on "questionable" constitutional foundations); Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism and Interstate Commerce 9 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981) [hereinafter Kitch, Regulation] (calling Court's doctrine
illegitimate and inefficient); Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, 6 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119, 123 (1982) (calling dormant commerce power doctrine "an idea of
absolutely no merit"); see also Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct.
2810, 2829 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court for over
a century has engaged in an enterprise that it has been unable to justify ...that it was almost
certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken very well.").
15 See notes 69-84 and accompanying text infra.
16 See text accompanying notes 25-52, 105-10 infra.
17See notes 205, 287-89, 394-75 and accompanying text infra.
18See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982); Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 Const. Commentary 395 (1986);
O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 Or. L. Rev. 395 (1982); Sedler,
The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne L. Rev. 885 (1985); Tushnet, Rethinking
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125. But see Hellerstein, Constitutional
Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1; Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 1091, 1160-76 (1986). For a discussion of the political process theory see notes 397-403
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doctrine the special legislative motivation standard of modem suspect
classification law under the equal protection clause. 19
These theories erroneously entangle the doctrine in constitutional
debates about judicial enforcement of personal rights. They also expose
the doctrine to criticism based on original intent. It is elementary to
show that the framers had no personal rights focus when writing the
commerce clause, and that in neither 1787 nor 1791 did they have in
mind important federal involvement in the subject of individual
rights
against state governments. 20 Those who wrote the fourteenth amendment intended federal intrusions, but they plainly did not think they were
rewriting the commerce clause.
Personal rights theories are wrong. The framers' concern with economic union arose from conflicts among the states and problems of foreign trade, not from disputes between the states and individual
merchants. 21 Many enumerated federal powers were intended to ameliorate interstate conflicts, particularly those in which stronger states beset
weaker. Although the Court's dormant commerce power opinions do
not acknowledge this origin as frankly as they should, the Court's doctrine is, in fact, based on resolving commercial conflicts between states.
Many of the Court's controversial rules, particularly those striking down
state transportation regulations and those sustaining certain state laws
that appear highly parochial, make sense when we recognize that the
doctrine is grounded in intergovernmental rights rather than in personal
rights. 22 The doctrine's use of the concept of discrimination does not
mean personal discrimination against outsiders; it is an instrumental device to identify protectionist actions by state governments that are hostile
to other states. 23 Although merchants often sue to enforce the doctrine,
they do so as surrogates for their own states, acting in effect as private
24
attorneys general.
My principal aims in this Article are to show the basis of the dormant commerce power doctrine in interstate conflicts, the order that the
interstate perspective brings to the Court's decisions, and the confusion
and distortion caused by constitutional theories based on personal rights.
Part I states a brief history of the dormant commerce power doctrine.
and accompanying text infra.
19See Farber, supra note 18, at 400-06; Regan, supra note 18, at 1143-60. A third influence of fourteenth amendment law has surfaced in attempts to distinguish between facial discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce and discriminatory effect. This has
produced minor doctrinal confusion. See text accompanying notes 214-20 infra.
20 See notes 69-84 and accompanying text infra.
21 See id.

22 See text accompanying notes 221-46, 270-300 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 189-203 infra.
24 See notes 108, 415-16 and accompanying text infra.
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Part II explains in some detail my view of current doctrine to show its
theoretical basis in promoting a national common market and protecting
states against interference by other states. Part III criticizes alternative
academic theories based on personal rights concepts: legislative motivation theories borrowed from the fourteenth amendment and the political
process theory of Chief Justice Stone and Dean Ely. The Article concludes by discussing the doctrine's efficiency and appraising the case for
doctrinal change.
I
HISTORY

A.

Evolution of the Dormant Commerce Power Doctrine

Between 1824 and 1873, the Supreme Court incrementally assumed
authority to enforce implicit commerce clause limits on state law.2 5 The
earliest lawsuits seeking to limit state regulations were based on the argument that the federal commerce power is exclusive of state power over
the same subject. This concept was raised at the Constitutional Convention, but it was not explained and may have meant different things from
speaker to speaker. 26 When the argument reached the courts, Kent pronounced it "a monstrous heresy,"' 27 but Marshall said it had "great
28
force."
In the formative years of constitutional judicial review, the Court
repeatedly faced arguments that one or another power granted to the
national government was implicitly exclusive of state power.29 In a tautological sense, the argument was correct. No state can exercise the powers given to Congress as such; no state can legislate coercively over other
states. This meaning may account for some historical statements that
federal powers are exclusive. 30 But litigants contended that exclusive
25 The first unequivocal enforcement was in Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 232 (1873). For cases in which the Court took important steps, see Woodruff v.
Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Almy
v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.)
596 (1855); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); The Passenger Cases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
26 See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 434 (1941).
27 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 578 (N.Y. 1812) (Kent, C.J.).
28 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
29 See D. Currie, supra note 4, at 117-18, 148-50, 172-83, 241-45.
30 See, e.g., Tucker, 1 Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the Consti-

tution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth
of Virginia app. at 179-81 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803). Tucker's treatise was cited by counsel for
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congressional powers implicitly removed internal state authority over the

same subjects. The Court sensibly rejected all of these claims in broad or
31

absolute form.
In a few important instances, however, the Court sustained the argument that state actions sometimes must yield to unexercised federal
powers. These were in areas in which state action had serious effects on
the federal government itself,32 on its relations with foreign nations, 33 or
on other states.3 4 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 35 the Court struck down New
York's steamboat monopoly on federal preemption grounds, but noted
36
that there was "force" in the exclusive commerce power argument.
The invalid monopoly imposed substantial extraterritorial burdens on
37
New Jersey, a smaller and weaker state.
The exclusive commerce power theory was more difficult to apply to
state tax laws. The federal taxing power was recognized as plainly concurrent with retained state power. 38 A more specific obstacle was Hamilton's Number 32 of The Federalist, in which he said that there are no
implied constitutional limits on state taxing powers. 39 As a limit on state
tax laws, the dormant commerce power doctrine had to enter by the side
Gibbons. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 179. Since Tucker was a Jeffersonian, it is unlikely that he favored a strongly nationalist interpretation of the Constitution.
The tautological meaning resembles the Virginia Plan at the Convention, allowing Congress "to legislate in all cases .. to which the states are separately incompetent." 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter Records
of the Federal Convention].
31 See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 584-85, 624 (1847); Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
32 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also Ableman v. Booth,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (state courts lack paramount jurisdiction over courts of United
States).
33 See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-51 (1979) (foreign commerce); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436-41 (1968) (foreign affairs); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-17 (1917) (admiralty). The Court has spoken ambiguously in the
area of immigration and naturalization; because there has been federal legislation since the first
Congress, the issue is probably moot. See Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269, 275
(1817) (power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress).
34 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (interstate commerce); see
also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622-26 (1842) (Constitution's fugitive-slave
clause is exclusive of state sovereignty and legislation).
35 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
36 Id. at 209.
37 Webster, counsel for the defendant-appellant, argued that New York's monopoly created interstate hostility and led to New Jersey's retaliatory laws. See id. at 4-5, 17. But see
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250-51 (1829) (no extraterritorial
impact of legislation authorizing construction of a dam across a navigable creek).
38 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199 (dictum) ("The power of taxation is indispensable to [the states'] existence, and... is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different
authorities at the same time.").
39 The Federalist No. 32, at 199-200 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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door, disguised by import-export clause arguments and "jurisdiction to
tax" arguments. 4°
The dormant commerce power doctrine remained in doubt during
the Taney years. On three occasions, Chief Justice Taney forcefully argued that only explicit acts of Congress should limit state regulation or
taxation of interstate or foreign commerce. 41 However, two of these
opinions were dissents, and all three responded to the argument that the
federal commerce power was broadly exclusive of any state authority
over the same subjects. 42
When the argument shifted to more limited, implicit restraints on
states, Chief Justice Taney went along. He silently joined the majority
opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,43 which is now a basic precedent
for the dormant commerce clause doctrine. 44 He also joined the Court's
surprising holding in Hays v. PacificMail S.S. Co.,45 voiding California's
property tax as applied to visiting ships on the ground that the state had
46
no jurisdiction to tax them.
See notes 45-46 and accompanying text infra.
41 See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 579-80
(1852) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573, 578-86 (1847) (Taney,
C.J.). Wheeling was a preemption case, but Taney's dissent identified the influence of the
exclusive commerce power theory on the majority's statutory interpretation. See Wheeling, 54
U.S. (13 How.) at 584-85; see also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 428-30 (1827)
(in which Taney was counsel for state).
42 Taney's opinion in the License Cases is the crown jewel in many arguments that the
dormant commerce power doctrine is wrong. See, e.g., D. Currie, supra note 4, at 225-26, 278,
454. Such commentators typically read too much into the opinion. Taney stated that "the
mere grant of power to the general government cannot .. be construed to be an absolute
prohibition to the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States." 46 U.S. (5 How.)
at 579 (emphasis added). But his opinion supported some limits on state power to regulate
interstate commerce by stating that state taxes on goods in interstate transit would be invalid.
Id. at 575-76. He also suggested that extraterritorial effects might justify invalidating a state
law. See id. at 585.
43 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
44 Cooley sustained Philadelphia's pilotage regulation as a permissible local regulation, but
the Court's opinion is known for its dictum stating that the federal commerce power was
exclusive over subjects of legislation that demanded uniform national regulation. See id. at
319. Only Justice Daniel disagreed with the dictum. See id. at 325-26 (Daniel, J., concurring).
45 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
46 The commerce clause was urged by counsel, see 15 L. Ed. at 254, but the Court did not
refer to any provision of the Constitution as a basis for its holding. Later opinions recognized
the commerce clause as the proper basis for Hays. See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 441-44 (1979); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1873).
Only Justice Daniel dissented in Hays. He was the only member of the Court who consistently opposed any implicit commerce clause limits on state laws. See J. Frank, Justice
Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. Daniel, 1784-1860, at 190-99 (1964).
Another surprising feature of Hays was the failure of the Court to say anything about the
fact that the state was attempting to tax a foreign corporation within its borders, despite Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 524 (1839), in which the Court had said that states
40
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In Almy v. California,47 Chief Justice Taney wrote for the Court to
overturn a state tax on exports of precious metals to other states based
upon the import-export clause.4 8 In Woodruff v. Parham,49 the Chase
Court reinterpreted Almy to rest on the dormant commerce power and
articulated the basic doctrine that the Court follows today.50 Although

Justice Miller's opinion in Woodruff upheld a state tax, its reasoning led
to active and frequent invalidation of state laws under the dormant commerce power.5 1 Since then, debate within the Court has been over the
52
doctrine's definition and scope, not its existence.

Dormant commerce power policy has influenced strongly the interpretation of federal commercial statutes. Preemption decisions are often
based on the same criteria that the Court employs to apply the dormant
power. Of course, free trade preemption is formally older than the dormant commerce power doctrine.5 3 In modem times, the relationship behave plenary power over foreign corporations.
47 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861).
48 Id. at 173-75. Justice Daniel was no longer on the Court, and there were no dissenters.
49 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).
50 See id. at 137-48.
51 See, e.g., Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640
(1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Guy v. City of Baltimore,
100 U.S. 434 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 471 (1873); Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873); see also D.
Currie, supra note 4, at 335-42, 405-16, 449-50. The Court equivocated once after Woodruff.
In Osborne v. City of Mobile, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 479 (1873), it sustained a municipal license
tax on express companies that was higher in amount for interstate firms than for those operating within Alabama. The opinion cryptically said that "no objection to the license tax was
taken at the bar on the ground of discrimination." Id. at 482. But see Leloup, 127 U.S. at 647
(stating that later decisions made ordinance in Osborne "repugnant to the power conferred
upon Congress to regulate commerce among the several States").
52 Since 1873, the doctrine's strongest opponent on the Court was Justice Black. He advocated restricting the doctrine to cases of "discrimination," although it is unclear what he
meant by that. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 387 (1946) (Black, J., concurring)
(although precedent commands invalidation of state law that imposes "undue burden" on
commerce, this role is properly left to Congress); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309
U.S. 176, 184 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ.) (Court's role
in policing state legislation is limited to laws that discriminate against interstate commerce).
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas at first agreed with Black but later became supportive of the
doctrine. Compare Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (Douglas, J.)
("[S]tate regulations that run afoul of the policy of free trade reflected in the commerce clause
must... bow.") and Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (invalidating
tax on interstate sales of securities as direct burden on interstate commerce) with McCarroll,
309 U.S. at 183 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ.) (joining dissent
that favored limited role for Court in dormant commerce power enforcement). Chief Justice
Rehnquist favors restricting the doctrine. See note 495 and accompanying text infra. Justice
Scalia has questioned the historical grounds for the doctrine, its application, and its expansion.
See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2826-29 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186-222 (1824); see also Pensacola Tel. Co.
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878); Sinnott v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227,
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tween the two judicial doctrines has been widely recognized.5 4
B.
1.

OriginalIntent

Constitutional Text

The dormant commerce power doctrine has no direct support in the
text of the Constitution. The words of the commerce clause grant regulatory power to Congress and do not explicitly limit the states when Congress has not acted; nor do the words suggest that the Supreme Court
was intended to enforce the clause directly. Specific provisions forbid
state duties on foreign imports and exports5 5 and on shipping, 56 and state
discriminations against citizens of other states, 57 implying the deliberate
absence of other imitsA 8 The simplest view is to stop right there and
conclude that the clause imposes no implicit limits on the states, as Justice Daniel maintained.5 9 Those whose great concern is to limit federal
judicial power to that explicitly granted find the argument just as compelling today.60

However, the negative inference drawn from the import-export
clause raises a puzzling problem. The Supreme Court has held that the
explicit limits of the clause apply only to foreign trade, not to interstate
commerce. 61 Assuming this is right, it is odd that the framers would

directly forbid state tariffs on foreign goods, but allow them on interstate
shipments absent an act of Congress to the contrary. A possible explanation is that foreign duties were a more important subject in 1787 than
240-44 (1859); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852).
54 See, e.g., Cohen, Congressional Power to Define State Power to Regulate Commerce:
Consent and Pre-emption, in 2 Courts and Free Markets 523, 53845 (1982); Note, Pre-Emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208, 219-21
(1959).
5 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
56 See id. cl. 3.
57 See id. art IV, § 2, cl. 1 (privileges and immunities clause).
58 See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578-86 (1847); The Federalist No. 32, at
199 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
59 See note 46 supra.
60 See, e.g., Graglia, The Supreme Court and the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism and Interstate Commerce 68 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
61 See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 130-36 (1869). The analysis in Woodruff was debatable. One of Justice Miller's arguments rested on the broad reading of the import-export clause known as the "original package doctrine," which the Court has since
renounced. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 301 (1976). For the view that
Woodruff was wrong in its reading of history, see I W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution
in the History of the United States 315-23 (1953). However, Justice Miller's argument that a
basic purpose of the import-export clause, and a benchmark for review of state laws alleged to
infringe the clause, was to secure federal tariff revenues against erosion by state laws has not
been successfully refuted. See Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 132-33. This purpose has no
relation to interstate barriers.
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interstate tariffs. 62 And, perhaps, interstate rivalries were assumed to be
unimportant. However, this reasoning is inconsistent with much of the
contemporaneous argument about the need for a new Constitution, argument that stressed interstate commercial rivalry. 63 That the burden of
congressional inertia should favor the states in interstate but not foreign
trade is not irrational but is at least curious.
Two lesser textual problems arise from the framers' failure to anticipate the dominance of corporations in commercial organization and the
shift from water to land transportation. The privileges and immunities
clause guards aspects of economic union for sole proprietors and partners; it was not designed for corporations." The admiralty power, 65 the
import-export clause,6 6 and the duty-of-tonnage clause 67 protect water
68
transport but not land.

2.

ConstitutionalHistory

Few constitutional theorists rest on text alone. Even those who
strongly advocate close adherence to original intent of the framers recognize the need for further inquiry beyond bare text. When constitutional
history is considered, the case for the dormant commerce power doctrine
and its preemption companion improves.
Most historians believe that commercial issues galvanized the call
69
for the Convention and were an important incentive for ratification.
62 See notes 69-84 and accompanying text infra.
63 See M. Farrand, The Fathers of the Constitution 97-107 (1921) (noting that state rivalry
threatened interstate trade); J. Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America 23 (G. Hunt & J. Scott eds.
1920) (reporting that Randolph specified as defect of confederation "that the federal government could not check the quarrels between states").
64 The privileges and immunities clause protects state "citizens," and the Court has consistently held that corporations are not citizens for purposes of the clause. See, e.g., Western &
S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82 (1869).
65 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; id. art. I, § 10. The admiralty power presents a problem of
constitutional interpretation that is the exact converse of the dormant commmerce power.
Article III explicitly confers judicial authority, but article I does not directly mention the
subject. The Court implied legislative power, a view that has not been controversial. See In re
Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1891).
66 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
67 Id. cl. 3.
68 The import-export and duty-of-tonnage clauses forbid tariffs on goods and duties on
ships; the latter is needed to make the former effective. The Court has mirrored these provisions in its rules for other forms of transport under the commerce clause. See text accompanying notes 270-300 infra.
69 See G. Dietze, The Federalist: A Classic on Federalism and Free Government 50-55
(1960); M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of The United States 45 (1913); 1
Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 30, at 19; Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, in American Law and The Constitutional Order 85, 86-
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When commercial issues were debated at the Convention, there was great
concern about foreign commerce. In particular, the framers wanted a
stronger national union to compete more effectively with the British.
The framers believed that British trade domination was made possible by
interstate squabbling and the lack of adequate central authority to require states to honor their obligations and agreements. 70 Accordingly,
they granted power to regulate foreign commerce to the federal
71
government.
Interstate rivalry was the Convention's greatest concern. Small
states feared the power of large, and the South feared commercial domination by the North and federal interference with slavery. The Great
Compromise on the structure of Congress mainly settled the former issue, and other compromises suppressed the question of slavery in return
72
for unqualified federal power over interstate and foreign commerce.
The provisions in the Articles of Confederation concerning commercial
harmony among the states were carried forward and strengthened in article IV. 7 3 Their enforcement was assured by articles III and VI. 74
Many writings at the time of the Convention condemned commercial exploitation of one state by another with respect to foreign trade. 75
Some discussed exploitation of weak states by stronger ones. Others decried exploitation of favorable geography to tax goods passing through
ports on the way to or from less favored states. 76 It can be argued that
the import-export and tonnage duty clauses were intended as complete
87 (1978).
70 See E. Elliott, Biographical Story of the Constitution 7-9 (1910); 2 C. Nettles, The
Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815, at 90-94 (1962); A. Nevins, The American
States During and After the Revolution 1775-1789, at 641 (1924); The Federalist No. 22, at
135-37 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
71 See M. Jensen, The New Nation 287-89 (1950); C. Nettles, supra note 70, at 90-92; A.
Nevins, supra note 70, at 642-44; Abel, supra note 26, at 466.
72 See J. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 218-19, 224-25
(1966); C. Rossiter, 1787 The Grand Convention 215-17 (1966); D. Smith, The Convention
and the Consitution 50-52 (1965).
73 Compare U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.") with Articles of Confederation
art. IV ("IT]he people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions, as inhabitants thereof respectively.").
74 See M. Farrand, supra note 63, at 131; The Federalist No. 40, at 262-63 (. Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961); T. Norton, The Constitution of the United States 156-69 (1922); C. Rossiter,
supra note 72, at 209; C. Warren, The Making of The Constitution 384-91 (1928).
75 See Abel, supra note 26, at 448-51, 449 nn. 69-70.
76 See Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 574 (1878); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 123, 134-36 (1869); M. Farrand, supra note 63, at 29-30; The Federalist No. 7, at 39-41
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Abel, supra note 26, at 448-49. As explained in Part II, this
type of interference in trade is a paradigm problem addressed by the Court's allocation of
jurisdiction and uniformity principles.
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responses to these questions. 77 This interpretation, however, requires a
very broad reading to account for state exactions besides duties and excises. 78 Also, that reading would not reach state impositions on goods
moving between two states and passing through a third-a problem that
grew in importance as interior states were admitted. A federal common
market must allow states some, but not unlimited, jurisdiction over
goods in transit through their territory;79 this requires an elaboration beyond the obvious scope of any textual source.
In contrast to foreign trade and commerce in transit, commerce
clause limits on protectionism in interstate trade are less well supported
in the Convention record. There was no specific condemnation of state
tariffs against goods from other states.8 0 The antiprotectionism norm
must rest instead on inferences drawn from general remarks at the Convention and in The Federalist about interstate rivalry and economic
union. s1 It can also be supported by interpreting the import-export and
tonnage duty clauses to establish a constitutional policy against state protectionism that is implicit in the commerce clause as well. This argument
is countered by the negative implication raised by the import-export and
82
tonnage duty clauses, but that inference is far from conclusive.
Perhaps the most explicit historical support for the dormant commerce power was Madison's recollection many years later of the purpose
of the interstate commerce power.
I made no reference to the "power to regulate commerce among
the several States." I always foresaw that difficulties might be started
in relation to that power which could not be fully explained without
recurring to views of it, which, however just, might give birth to speSee text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436-39 (1827);
note 82 and accompanying text infra.
79 See Prichard & Benedickson, Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and
Internal Barriers to Trade, in Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union 6-7 (1983); text
accompanying notes 270-72 infra.
80 See Abel, supra note 26, at 450 & n.78.
81 See M. Farrand, supra note 63, at 29-30, 97, 99; A. Nevins, supra note 70, at 556-61; C.
Rossiter, supra note 72, at 47; D. Smith, supra note 72, at 16-17; C. Warren, supra note 74, at
5-6, 85, 166-71; The Federalist No. 6, at 30-36 (A. Hamilton) (. Cooke ed. 1961); The Federalist No. 7, at 39-41 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also The Federalist No. 11, at 7172 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("An unrestrained intercourse between States themselves
will advance the trade of each.... The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished,
and will acquire additional motion and vigour from a free circulation of the commodities of
every part.").
82 See notes 55-68 and accompanying text supra. In Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 438 (1827), Marshall expressly relied on negative implication (expressio unius est
exclusio alterius) to construe the import-export clause. But his construction of the commerce
clause ignored this maxim's possible application. See id. at 445-49. This was not owing to any
laxity on the part of Taney and Johnson, counsel for Maryland. See id. at 430-31.
77
78
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cious though unsound objections. Being in the same terms with the
power over foreign commerce, the same extent, if taken literally, would
belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it grew out of the abuse of the
power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was
intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice
among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government, in which alone, how83
ever, the remedial power could be lodged.
Madison's statement that the commerce power was "intended as a
negative" is direct support for the substance of a dormant commerce
power doctrine, although it does not advert to judicial stewardship. Of

course, very little in constitutional history directly supports judicial review. Madison's remark that, as a proponent of the Constitution, he had
deliberately kept quiet about the meaning of the interstate commerce
power to facilitate adoption and ratification is intriguing. It raises a spe-

cial difficulty in ascertaining the original intent of the interstate part of
the commerce clause. But at the least, Madison's recollection, and statements in the Convention record, show some expectation that the clause

would serve as a "preventive provision against injustice among the States
84
themselves."
It must nevertheless be conceded that the case in favor of the dormant commerce power doctrine rests on inconclusive inferences about

the Constitution. An initial examination of the question based on text
and recorded history could reject the Court's role in policing interstate

commerce and limit federal authority to Congress, as Justice Daniel had
85
wished to do.
However, most early interpretations favored implicit limits on state
power. The first Supreme Court vote to invalidate a state law based on
the commerce clause alone was that of Justice Johnson, Jefferson's most
Republican appointment, in Gibbons v. Ogden.8 6 The rest of the Court
83 Letter from James Madison to J. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 4 Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison at 14-15 (1B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia 1865) [hereinafter
Letters]. Madison restated this view in more detail three years later. See Letter from James
Madison to Prof. Davis (1832), reprinted in 4 Letters, supra, at 251-54. In the second letter,
he discussed the problem of interior states and noted that their condition "is of itself sufficient
proof that it could not be the intention of those who framed the Constitution to substitute for a
power in Congress to impose a protective tariff, a power merely to permit the states individually to do it." Id. at 251.
84 Letter from James Madison to J. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 4 Letters, supra
note 83, at 15; see also Abel, supra note 26, at 469 & n.167, 475 (characterizing Madison's
statement as expressing idea that clause is shield, not sword, to guard against state-created
discriminations and preferences).
85 See notes 46 supra and 89 infra.
86 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring); see Morgan, Mr. Justice
Johnson and the Constitution, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 328-29 (1944).
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agreed with Marshall's opinion that the idea had merit, and the exclusive
commerce power theory rather clearly influenced the Court's preemption
holding.8 7 Story and other theorists endorsed it. 8 8 When Taney wrote a
clear opinion rejecting the exclusive commerce power argument, only
Justice Daniel agreed. 89 Taney retreated in later cases, and only Daniel,
in the Court's entire history, consistently rejected the doctrine. 9°
Justice Curtis, author of Cooley v. Board of Wardens,9 1 was one of
the ablest members of the 1850s Court.92 Justice Miller, who developed
the doctrine's practical application, has been lionized as the Court's leading constitutional theorist during the post-Civil War era. 93 Finally, Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo shaped modem articulations. 94 It
takes a good deal of hubris to dismiss the doctrine in the face of this
history.
87 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.

88 See W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 75-78 (1825);
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 365-71 (abr. ed. 1833).
89 See note 41 and accompanying text supra. As stated above, Taney rejected the exclusive
commerce clause theory but recognized aspects of what we now view as the dormant commerce power doctrine. Justice Daniel refused to join Taney's opinion in The License Cases, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), because of these qualifications; he would unequivocally have backed
state freedom from implied federal restraint. See id. at 611-18 (Daniel, J.).
90 See note 46 supra. Justice Scalia has taken the same position as Justice Daniel. See
Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2826-29 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
92 See D. Currie, supra note 4, at 279, 454; Gillette, Benjamin R. Curtis, in 2 The Justices
of the United States Supreme Court 1789-1969, at 895-905 (1969).
93 See C. Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court 1862-1890, at 309-16 (1939);
Gillette, Samuel Miller, in 2 The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789-1969, at
1011, 1021-23 (1969).
Professor Kitch attempts to attribute the dormant commerce power doctrine to Justice
Field. See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 27-29. This will not do. Justice Field was of
two minds about the doctrine, as shown by his dissents from important instances of its enforcement. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 499, 502 (1887) (Waite,
C.J., dissenting, joined by Field & Gray, JJ.). He preferred his own creation--economic due
process under the fourteenth amendment-which he was unable to sell to the Court until
Justice Miller had died. See D. Currie, supra note 4, at 335-51, 357-58, 369-78, 449-50; McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970 (1975). Justice
Bradley was the other leading proponent of the doctrine during the Miller and Field years. See
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 432-33 (1871) (Bradley, J., concurring); Brown,
The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L.J. 219,
239 (1957). Justice Field did bequeath us the mysterious notion of the silence of Congress. See
note 105 and accompanying text infra.
94 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Stone, C.J.);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); Bradley v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (Brandeis, J.); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43-45
(1927) (Stone, J., dissenting); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (Brandeis, J.).
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Can the FramersBe Trusted?

According to Professor Edmund Kitch, the original history of the
commerce clause is insufficient support for the dormant commerce power
doctrine because the framers' statements about interstate economic exploitation and retaliation under the Confederation were greatly exaggerated or even false. Professor Kitch argues that the Confederation was an
economic success and the Constitution was not needed for commercial
prosperity. 95
There are several answers to Professor Kitch's thesis. He rests most
of his case on four similar history articles published in the 1950s that
described the tariff laws of four of the most important commercial states
during the Confederation. 96 The author of all four, William F. Zornow,
claimed that state tariff laws usually exempted imports in their original
packages that were bound for other states. 97 Thus, concludes Professor
Kitch, the framers' complaints about exploitation of commerce in transit
through these states were false. 98 Zornow also claimed generally that
contemporaneous accusations of commercial hostility among the states
were overblown. 99
While the claim that the framers exaggerated commercial difficulties
under the Confederation is probably true,1°0 Professor Kitch's conclusion from Zornow's history that there were no major commercial
problems among the states is unjustified. Zornow examined only tariff
laws, and he is essentially correct about them. 10 ' But formal tariffs are
not the only way in which a state can exploit its geographic position to
tax goods in transit through its ports, rivers, or highways, or engage in
protectionism. In Brown v. Maryland,l0 2 for example, the use of other
taxes to burden commerce in transshipped goods was an explicit concern
of the Court despite the formal tariff exemption.103
This is not a conclusive answer to Professor Kitch's argument. He
95 See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 15-19. The argument is made to seem stronger
by emphasizing The Federalistrather than the records at Philadelphia or the ratifying conventions; it is easier to denigrate the former as propaganda.
96 See id. at 17-19 (discussing Zomow, New York Tariff Policies 1775-1789, 37 Proc. N.Y.
St. Hist. A. 40 (1956); Zornow, Tariff Policies in South Carolina 1775-1789, 55 S.C. Hist. Mag.
31 (1955); Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, 1775-1789, 90 Essex Inst. Hist. Collections
194 (1954); Zornow, The Tariff Policies of Virginia, 1775-1789, 62 Va. Mag. Hist. 306 (1954)).
97 See id. at 18.
98 See id. at 19.

99 See id.
100 See, e.g., A. Nevins, supra note 70, at 602-05.

101 The report of Brown v. Maryland shows that Maryland's tariff law of 1783 had the same
structure as the tariff laws of the four states that Zornow examined. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419, 422-23 (1827) (argument of Mr. Meredith).
102 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
103 See id. at 449; see also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283-86 (1976).
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rightly points out that the framers' complaints of interstate exploitation
have few verifications in historical records. It remains possible that
Madison and others were mendacious regarding this subject. On the

other hand, the framers' concerns may have been more anticipatory than
curative. When the Constitution was written, the Confederation had existed for only four peacetime years. To conclude from this tiny slice of
time that the American states would achieve a better level of economic
harmony by political bargaining than by central authority is extremely
speculative.
The most important answer to Professor Kitch is that his proposal,
like the many other academic calls for judicial abolition of the dormant
commerce power doctrine, would be a radical policy shift. It should be
justified more carefully and extensively than Professor Kitch has done. 04
C. Implied Consent of Congress
Justice Field coined the theory that the dormant commerce power
doctrine is based on the implied will of Congress that commerce "shall be
free." 10 5 As an a priori justification, this argument borders on the absurd. The framers did not erect the complex labyrinth of the federal
legislative process to see it disregarded when Congress is silent. 10 6
Congressional acquiescence to a settled judicial doctrine is another
matter. The Court has repeatedly made it clear that Congress may limit
or overrule the dormant commerce power doctrine in its discretion. That
Congress has chosen to exercise this power only to override a few aberrant judicial mistakes implies at least congressional complacency.1 07
104 See text accompanying notes 494-500 infra.
105 Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 508 (1888) (Field, J.,
concurring); see also

County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1881); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282
(1876); Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556,
583-85 (1936).
106 See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2828 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
951 (1983).
107 See, e.g., Bowman, 125 U.S. 465 and Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), which invalidated nondiscriminatory liquor prohibition laws applied to imported intoxicants. These are
strong candidates for the Court's silliest misapplications of the doctrine. Chief Justice Fuller's
dreadful opinion in Leisy seems to have been influenced by substantive due process arguments
and by the original package doctrine under the import-export clause. Congress promptly overrode these decisions by passing the Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The Court unanimously sustained the statutory override. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); see also Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). The ambiguities of the twenty-first
amendment are a continuing legacy of Leisy. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 334 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
In another misapplication, the Court defied economic logic by holding that "[i]ssuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.... Such contracts are not inter-state
transactions, though the parties be domiciled in different States." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
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Furthermore, that states have so seldom sought Congress's assistance
against the Court strongly suggests that the doctrine is not altogether
unpopular in state capitals either. The essential beneficiaries of the interstate branch of the doctrine are other states, particularly smaller ones
lacking geographic advantages.10 8 When states are unhappy with the
Court's decisions, they make themselves heard. Why has there not been
at least one bill to abolish the doctrine?

Congress's actions in response to judicial restrictions on state tax
laws strongly support implied ratification. Since 1959, Congress has
studied judicial doctrine on state taxing power extensively 0 9 and has enacted statutes more restrictive of state taxing power than the Court's

decisions. 110
Most modem constitutional debates about judicial review center on

the antimajoritarian objection. Because Congress can overrule the
Court, the dormant commerce power doctrine does not infringe on maWall.) 168, 183 (1869). Based on this decision, the insurance industry was excluded from
coverage of both the antitrust laws and the dormant commerce power. See New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 509 (1913). In a 1944 antitrust decision, the Court
corrected its characterization of the industry. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-53 (1944). But by that time many states had established elaborately discriminatory regulatory and tax schemes in reliance on Paul,and they resisted judicial
instrusion. Congress responded by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33
(1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)), specifically excluding insurance from the dormant commerce power doctrine. The Court unanimously upheld the statute.
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
The rule exempting the insurance industry from dormant commerce power coverage has
been repeatedly reaffirmed in recent years. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1985). But the Court polices parochial state insurance laws under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 874-75 (1985); Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
108 See text accompanying notes 170-71, 270-72 infra. States occasionally sue directly to
enforce the doctrine. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
In some but not all of these cases, the Court has allowed states to invoke the Court's original
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maryland, 451 U.S. at 735-45. But see id. at 760-71 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In other cases, states take the side of parties seeking to enforce the doctrine. See,
e.g., Brief of the State of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellants, American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987) (No. 86-357).
109 See Sales and Use Taxes: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); State
Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations: Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962); State Taxation on Interstate Commerce, 1959: Hearing Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. Rep. No. 952, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 1480,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). But see H.R. 1242, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (bill to override
Court by authorizing states to impose retail sales taxes on goods entering by mail or common
carrier).
110 See note 275 infra.
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jority rule. Rather, the doctrine raises only federalism concerns. Since
state autonomy is the only competing constitutional value at issue, and
the states have not sought to abolish the doctrine, the case for continuing
the Court's power to promote interstate commercial harmony is strong.
II
THE COURT'S DOCTRINE AND THE PROMOTION OF
INTERSTATE HARMONY

A common market requires reasonable mobility of goods and people
across interior borders.1" Many American institutions serve this purpose without constitutional controversy. We no longer question a national currency and monetary system or national regulation of banking.
No one advocates separate state-run postal systems or copyright, patent,
or bankruptcy laws. The propriety of national investment in interstate
transportation ceased to be disputed over a century ago. We also have a
national system of weights and measures. But each of these institutions
is based on affirmative undertakings by Congress, carrying out its enumerated powers.
States have seldom seriously impeded personal migration across
their borders. Until recently, we were a labor-short nation, and states
wanted to attract immigrants, not keep them out. There have been a few
major lawsuits challenging discrimination against nonresident workers or
burdens on the right to migrate interstate. These have been based on the
explicit terms of the interstate privileges and immunities clause,11 2 the
commerce clause,' 13 the equal protection clause, and the nontextual right
to travel. 114 None of these constitutional provisions prohibits state occupational licensing laws, which are an impediment to the migration of
skilled labor. However, such laws must be nondiscriminatory, and states
have worked out some reciprocity agreements.11 5
Interstate mobility of goods and transportation, by contrast, has
often been seriously obstructed by state taxes and regulations. 1 6 Under
III See Prichard & Benedickson, supra note 79, at 7.
112 See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
217-23 (1984) (law requiring minimum percentage of local workers in municipal construction
projects is subject to privileges and immunities clause).
113 See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating law prohibiting transport of indigent people into state).
114 See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-61, 65 (1982) (invalidating statute distinguishing between long-time residents and newcomers).
115 See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); Rosberg, Free
Movement of Persons in the United States, in 2 Courts and Free Markets 275, 340-44 (1982).
116 See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (state prohibited
hydroelectricity exports); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (state barred
out-of-state bank holding company services); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
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the dormant commerce power doctrine, the Court has attempted to limit
state barriers to economic integration without unduly restricting state

autonomy.
A.

An Overview of the Court's Formal Tests and Their Deficiencies

Supreme Court doctrine postulates that the commerce clause established a national interest in interstate and foreign trade free of excessive
state interference, which the courts have authority to defend. The national interest is said to be impaired to the degree that state laws "bur-

den" interstate or foreign commerce, that is, restrict market allocations

117
of resources across state borders or in other states.
Some state laws promote rather than burden commerce, such as
those defining basic property rights of ownership and alienability. Many
other laws are commerce-neutral except as part of a state's package of
laws competing against other states. But most taxes and commercial reg-

ulations displace or restrict market allocation

18 and

thus "burden" com-

merce. Because very few markets are entirely intrastate, almost any
burden on commerce affects border-crossing trade. If burden alone were
sufficient to invalidate, few state taxes or regulations would survive.11 9
Nor is the magnitude of burden the governing standard. This is a relevant factor, but the "nature of [the] burden is, constitutionally, more sig-

nificant than its extent." 120

To determine which burdens are invalid, the Court applies formal

and summary rules declared in two of its opinions, Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady 12 1 and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 122 Under both
(1978) (state prohibited waste imports); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)
(state required trucks to have unusual mudflaps).
117 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
118 Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ. 23, 23-24
(1983).
119 See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128-29.
120 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144 (1970).
121430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (stating that a state tax does not offend commerce clause if it
"is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided
by the State").
122397 U.S. 137 (1970)
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Subsidies also burden interstate and foreign commerce, but re-
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cases, state laws that discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce
are presumed invalid.12 3 Nondiscriminatory tax statutes must pass re124
quirements of nexus, apportionment, and relation to state services,
while nondiscriminatory regulation is evaluated under the Pike balancing
test, which contraposes the national free trade interest and state
autonomy. 125
For several reasons discussed fully below, these tests draw artificial
distinctions and do not adequately explain the Court's doctrine. Describing the national interest as free trade is misleading because it implies that
the doctrine's essential purpose is economic efficiency rather than interstate commercial harmony. 126 The Court's opinions tell us that the nature of burdens on commerce is more important than their magnitude,
but they do not systematically explain what kinds of burdens are bad. 127
The Court's antidiscrimination rule is usefully precise, but the Court
does not carefully guard it against the confusing influence of personal
discrimination doctrines under the fourteenth amendment and other constitutional provisions.1 28 Opinions occasionally mention protectionism,
but they do not adequately relate it to the antidiscrimination rule.1 29 The
Court at times relies on local political restraint and on market corrections as reasons to sustain state laws, but it does not explain when and
13 0
how these ideas are deployed.
Two important concepts are implicit in the cases but are not identiceive more deference from the Court. See text accompanying notes 332-69 infra.
123 The antidiscrimination rule is analyzed in text accompanying notes 189-246 infra.
Both cases apply only when Congress has not acted on an issue. Thus, congressional
prohibition preempts inconsistent state laws, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 15860 (1978), and congressional permission sustains state laws that the Court would otherwise
strike down, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-27 (1946). However, these
rules are applied to carry out the same basic policies as the dormant commerce power doctrine.
Statutes are construed liberally to preempt trade burdens, and strictly against permitting them.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1986).
124 These tests are analyzed in text accompanying notes 250-69, 276-89 infra.
125 The balancing test is analyzed in the text accompanying notes 290-300 infra. For many
years the Court's standard was to condemn "direct" burdens on interstate or foreign commerce and to sustain "indirect" burdens. Most laws struck down under this test either categorically discriminated against interstate commerce or imposed on interstate transportation.
Costs extracted by discriminatory rules are exclusively or more heavily imposed on commerce
that crosses the state's borders; costs imposed on transportation across state borders burden
interstate movement itself. But the direct-indirect rule failed to explain which nondiscriminatory rules were invalid and why, which led to its demise. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1927) (Stone,
J., dissenting).
126 See text accompanying notes 133-37 infra.
127 See text accompanying notes 138-42 infra.
128 See text accompanying notes 189-220, 394-475 infra.
129 See text accompanying notes 182-98 infra.
130 See text accompanying notes 149-81 infra.
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fled by the Court. One is the distinction between a state's burdens on its
import and export commerce (interstate and foreign), and its burdens on
commerce in transit through its territory and on transactions outside its
borders. 131 The second is the concept of allocating jurisdiction among
interested states; this single principle governs review of all the state laws
that the Court classifies as "nondiscriminatory." The Court obscures the
allocation principle by compartmentalizing the cases under its apparently
132
separate nexus, apportionment, services, and balancing tests.
This Section analyzes each of these shortcomings in the Court's explanations. I do not advocate amending the doctrine. With rare exceptions, the Court's results are right. However, the Court's jurisprudence
in this important area ought to be properly articulated in order to improve predictability of doctrine for future decision making.
1.

The National Interest

Some of the controversy about the dormant commerce power doctrine can be traced to lack of articulation of competing constitutional
values. Obviously, state autonomy is the fundamental value favoring validity of state taxes and regulations. Local lawmaking is preferred on
grounds of efficiency, participatory democracy, and diffusion of power.
These are broadly accepted postulates of the federal system; debates are
about their weight in context, not over their stature as basic constitutional precepts.
National values underlying the dormant commerce power doctrine
are not so well defined. Supreme Court opinions deprecate burdens on
interstate and foreign commerce and praise free trade. 133 These vague
terms have led many to assume that economic efficiency is the essential
national value arrayed against state autonomy. 134 According to this understanding, the doctrine presumes that private market allocation of
goods is the most efficient mechanism, and states must be restrained from
excessively interfering in national and international markets. This in
turn generates charges that the doctrine promotes laissez faire as a substantive constitutional value, for which there is no basis in the Constitu135
tion and its history.
This is essentially wrong. Economic efficiency is an important interest defining the doctrine's boundaries because the efficiency of local lawmaking is arrayed against that of a national market in determining which
131 See text accompanying notes 143-48 infra.
132 See text accompanying notes 247-53 infra.
133 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533, 538 (1949).
134 See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 602-07 (3d ed. 1986); Anson & Shenkkan, supra note 14, at 76-77; Eule, supra note 18, at 429-35; Tushnet, supra note 18, at 141-42.
135 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 18, at 429-35.
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state laws to sustain. But efficiency is not the central national value
served. The framers sought economic union, but the focus of their concern was interstate commercial harmony rather than market efficiency.1 3 6 When state taxes or regulations burden interstate commerce,
they not only reduce allocational efficiency but also interfere in policy
choices of other states. When states burden foreign commerce, they interfere in policy choices of other states or of the federal government or
both. When states engage in economic warfare against each other, ultimate losers are smaller and weaker states and those with less favorable
geography. A basic purpose of the framers was to curb interstate ex13 7
ploitation by stronger states and by those with geographic advantages.
2. Burdens on Commerce
When the dormant commerce power doctrine is viewed through the
prism of interstate harmony, its rules become more orderly and logical.
The doctrine is not concerned with severity of burdens on interstate and
international markets in general; its focus is on those kinds of market
interference that set state against state or that invade policy choices of
other states or of the federal government. To raise a serious claim under
the doctrine, a claimant must make a threshold showing that a state law
imposes more costs on border-crossing transactions than on those occurring entirely within the state. When state law burdens internal and border-crossing or external transactions equally, there is no threat to
interstate commercial harmony and the national interest is preserved. 3 8
State taxes and regulations that impose this threshold burden fall
into two broad categories. The first type burdens import or export transactions more than local ones to protect internal market interests against
external competition. This is protectionism, reviewed under the Court's
antidiscrimination rule. Under this rule, categorical discrimination
139
against external competition is, with minor exceptions, invalid.
The second category involves burdens on border-crossing commerce
that arise from the cumulative power of states to tax or regulate an interstate transaction or business more than once, and from the cost of complying with inconsistent state laws imposed on interstate transactions:
multiple and conflict burdens respectively. A routine example of multiple burdens arises from ordinary property taxes. If two states impose an
136 See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 25 (Supp. 1979).
137

See The Federalist No. 6 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 1 Records of the Federal

Convention, supra note 30, at 19, 164; C. Rossiter, supra note 72, at 47.
138 For example, when states forbid all commerce in unhealthy or dangerous products, such
as "controlled substances," tobacco products, or throw-away beverage containers, their laws
are sustained. See notes 198, 227-30, 235 and accompanying text infra.
139 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979).
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annual property tax on railroad cars, cars that travel between them pay
two taxes, while those remaining within one state pay only one. Minor
conflict burdens abound, and the Court is only concerned with severe
ones. The issue is easiest to pose hypothetically. If one state requires
that all trucks be painted red and its neighbor requires all to be blue, the
imposition on trucks traveling only within either of them is minor, but
that on trucks crossing the border is intolerable.14°
Multiple and conflict burdens can be said to have discriminatory
effects because transactions within one state enjoy lower state-imposed
costs. But these burdens inhere in a federal system; to eliminate them
entirely would require a unitary legal system. Recognizing this, some
have argued that the dormant commerce power doctrine must therefore
be confined to deliberate discrimination against interstate commerce or a
like standard.14 1 Although the Court does not agree, its rules limit the
concept of forbidden discrimination to protectionism. 142
3. DistinguishingImport-Export Commerce from Commerce in Transit
and External Commerce
The Court's decisions implicitly depend on an important analytical
distinction between state laws that burden only the stkte's imports or
exports (interstate or foreign), and those that burden commerce in transit
through the state or transactions outside it. Impositions on import-export commerce are valid unless protectionist, that is, unless they categorically discriminate in favor of transactions within the state and against
directly competing import or export transactions.1 43 Other burdens on
import-export commerce are labeled "nondiscriminatory" and sustained.
Impositions on commerce in transit or external transactions may be
invalid even if they are not categorically discriminatory. Nondiscriminatory multiple and conflict burdens are invalid when they substantially
burden commerce in transit through a state or transactions outside it. 144
In these cases, the Court's principal instrument is allocation of jurisdiction to the state with greatest interest in a subject. This is accomplished
under its nexus test, which bars impositions by states with insufficient
interest, under its apportionment test, which divides taxing jurisdiction
among interested states, and under its balancing test, which requires sub140 See text accompanying notes 290-300 infra. An actual case not materially different from
the hypothetical was Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), striking down Illinois's requirement that trucks have contour mudflaps.
141 See note 52 supra.
142 See text accompanying notes 189-91 infra.
143 See notes 189-98 and accompanying text infra.
144 See text accompanying notes 247-52 infra.
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stantial local justification for burdensome transportation regulations. 145
The distinction between import-export commerce, and commerce in
transit and external commerce is based upon several factors. One is the
obvious policy proposition that a state has greater legitimate interest in
regulating and taxing its imports and exports than in imposing on commerce in transit through the state or on transactions outside its borders.
In the latter group of cases, other states have much greater legitimate
interest. A second is that market forces counteract important kinds of
state parochialism respecting state imports and exports but are less effective to restrain impositions on commerce in transit or on external transactions.146 Third, local politics effectively discipline state lawmaking in
cases of nondiscriminatory regulations of imports and exports, but do not
do so for impositions on commerce in transit or external transactions. 147
The last two factors are related because when markets adjust to bring
costs home to the enacting state, its political process more effectively restrains its legislature.
The Court's opinions do not distinguish between import-export
cases and others. Perhaps this is because the two categories separate
only partially. Many actual cases involve exclusively import-export commerce and are subject only to the antiprotectionism norm. 48 But state
laws affecting commerce in transit or external transactions usually have
some effect on import-export and local commerce as well. The Court's
concern is with cases in which imposition on commerce in transit or on
external transactions predominates. Despite this complication, distinguishing between import-export commerce and the other categories is
quite useful for analytical purposes, as succeeding Sections will
demonstrate.
B. Evaluating the State Autonomy Interest
1.

Cost Exporting and Local PoliticalRestraint

In South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,149
the Court identified cost exporting and local political restraint as measures of a state's interest in regulating. The decision sustained a state law
that limited weights and widths of trucks using state highways. Justice
145 See notes 121-22 supra and text accompanying notes 247-331 infra. On allocation generally, see International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349-62 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); 1 J. Hellerstein, State Taxation 328-32 (1983).
146 See text accompanying notes 164-81 infra.
147 See text accompanying notes 149-63 infra.
148 See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
149 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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Stone's opinion for the Court said that the commerce clause prohibits
state legislation that "by its necessary operation is a means of gaining a
local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on those without the
state."' 15 0 "[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden
falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state." 5 1 Justice Stone concluded:
The present regulations.... if they are to accomplish their end, must
be applied alike to interstate and intrastate traffic both moving in large
volume over the highways. The fact that they affect alike shippers in
interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as
without the state is a safeguard against their abuse. 15 2
Although Justice Stone said that his point had been "often expressed," 153 he did not cite any prior opinion that articulated it. Justice
Cardozo had earlier stated the cruder variant that a state may not "project its legislation into [other states]." 1 54 Stone applied this view to tax
cases, 155 and many opinions since Barnwell have mentioned local polit156
ical restraint as a factor in dormant commerce power analysis.
Stone's point has obvious political virtue. When the people of a
state pay the price, they should be able to suppress commercial activity
that they deem harmful. When they impose the cost of suppression on
outsiders, they interfere in policy choices of other states or the federal
government, and judicial intervention may be warranted.
When one emphasizes effects on outsiders who cannot vote in the
state, it sounds like a version of the political branch of the process theory
of judicial review.1 57 However, modem process theorists usually assume
the personal-rights perspective of the Bill of Rights and fourteenth
amendment. Given its origin, purpose, and application, the political theory of the interstate commerce clause is based on a state-versus-state con150

Id. at 186.

151

Id. at 185 n.2.

Id. at 187.
153 Id. at 185 n.2.
154 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580-84 (1986) (state has no authority to control sales of liquor in other states); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-43
(1982) (invalidating securities regulation with "sweeping extraterritorial effect").
155 See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940).
156 See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18, 447 (1978);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945). Other opinions have
recognized the practical limitations of this concept. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
157 See text accompanying notes 397-99 infra.
152
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cept of political rights. 15 8 The dormant commerce power doctrine limits
a state's ability to exploit other states; it does not give personal rights to
every nonresident business harmed by state commercial regulation.
Economic aspects of Stone's norm are as significant as political elements, and they reinforce a state-versus-state focus. When a sovereign's
laws impose costs on those outside its borders, its lawmaking process is
inefficient. Taxes and regulations are like other products; when costs are
not borne by producers, these costs are disregarded, and we get more of
the products than an efficient market would supply. When costs imposed
by legislation are exported, political discipline that tends to minimize
these costs is relaxed, and there is a greater chance that the law will
reduce aggregate welfare. 159 When legislation benefits locals and burdens
their out-of-state competitors, the legislative goal is protectionism.
Efficiency of local lawmaking is a basic justification for state autonomy in the federal system. Local lawmaking can be more exactly tailored to particular problems and can more readily experiment with
different solutions. 16 0 Competition among legal systems generates efficiencies as jurisdictions compete to attract and retain people and capital.' 6 1 Local lawmaking best serves these ends when people and
resources are mobile and when local laws do not export significant
costs. 1 62 When government costs borne at home become relatively large,

a state's products are less competitive than products of states imposing
lower costs. Local politics then restrain the legislature. When the same
costs are largely exported, political restraint weakens or disappears. To
the extent that the dormant commerce power doctrine invalidates only
cost-exporting legislation, it defers to efficient local lawmaking and complements competition among legal systems.
Stone's norm thus offers an attractive measure of legitimate state
interest in regulation from either a political or economic perspective.
Applying it to actual markets and actual politics, however, leads to complexities that blunt theoretical appeal and limit the concept's usefulness.
There are several problems: laws never export all of the costs they impose, the political process responds much better to concentrated interests
158 See text accompanying notes 69-94 supra.
159 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 602-03.
160 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978); New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161 See Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 Va. L. Rev. 563, 57172 (1983); McLure, Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: An Examination of Four
Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 69, 74-80, 101 n.41, 102 n.54 (1982); Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 419-24 (1956).
162 See Easterbrook, supra note 118, at 28-29. Exported benefits cause lesser distortions.
Schwartz, Regulation of Industrial Subsidies in the EEC, the United States, and GATT, in
Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union 394, 404-07 (1983).
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than to dispersed ones, determining the actual incidence of state-imposed
costs is very difficult because markets reallocate costs in complex ways,
and market reallocation of government costs can vary significantly between the short and long term.
Some state laws that burden interstate or foreign commerce are fair
charges for governmental services provided or for spill-over costs of the
regulated activity. These charges cannot justly be criticized as exported
costs. And every law adversely affects some market actors in the state.
Import tariffs benefit local producers and the public treasury, but they
harm importers and consumers. Burdened out-of-state corporations
often have local shareholders, subsidiaries, or other allied interests.
Commerce in transit through a state benefits local providers of fuel, food,
and lodging, and they share its burdens. When internal costs are large,
and those bearing them are practically able to influence the political process, legislative efficiency improves, and there is less justification for judicial intervention.
Even if substantial costs are borne internally, local political
processes are inefficient when captured by concentrated and organized
interests. Political allocation of goods chronically disadvantages small
consumers. Local benefits of a state import quota are enjoyed by local
producers, and costs of the law are spread widely among the consuming
public; political restraint is weak even though costs fall heavily within the
state. Those paying the cost may be unaware of it. Even if aware, they
have greater difficulty organizing and bankrolling their opposition than
does the benefited industry. Collective action is restrained by information costs, organizing costs, and free-rider problems. 63 Conversely,
when a state law burdens unorganized local consumers but outside interests bearing some of the costs are concentrated, the external interests
may be able to galvanize political action by internal consumers.
2. Market Reallocation of Government-Imposed Costs
Market forces partially counteract parochial lawmaking. Two significant factors in the United States are the constitutionally protected
rights of persons to migrate freely to other states and of citizens to pursue
commercial opportunities in other states on the same terms as local citizens.l 64 These rights enable consumer and labor markets to adjust to
state manipulations, which disciplines local lawmaking. Likewise, the
threat of capital migration, aided by the common national currency and
by national banking regulation, limits parochial legislation. These fac163 See H. Grubel, International Economics 188-89 (rev. ed. 1981); R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 278-82 (1972).
164 See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
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tors distinguish the American national market from international markets, in which migration and nonresident enterprise are often restrained
by law, mobility is usually impeded by cultural165barriers and other personal costs, and capital transfers are hindered.
Another form of market adjustment is the "pass-on" of governmentimposed costs, when directly burdened parties charge these costs to their
suppliers or customers. Sometimes what seem to be exported costs are in
fact borne significantly at home, even in the short run, and vice versa.
Moreover, it is often difficult to determine the degree to which such adjustments occur. 166 But this is not a major factor in legal doctrine.
When a law discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce or imposes on an external transaction, pass-on may return some of the costs to
the regulating state. But the Court may reasonably require the regulating state to prove that costs apparently exported in fact fall at home. In
the converse case, when costs imposed at home are exported by pass-on,
the burden of proof is on parties challenging the regulations. Since proof
is difficult, the issue is largely disregarded.
Pass-ons are not only difficult to prove, they are often difficult to
recognize. Political restraint is not affected by unknown pass-ons. If
everyone mistakenly thinks costs are borne locally, the political process
behaves as though they are and disciplines government. If everyone mistakenly thinks costs are exported, the political process tends to burden
interstate mobility of resources. If a reviewing court shares the misapprehension that costs are exported, the law is likely to be struck down. If
a trial aided by hindsight reveals that costs intended to be exported in
fact fall predominantly on local merchants, the court might leave adjustment to the local political process. The issue is more complex if costs are
borne only by local consumers, who often have limited political
167
influence.
Market substitutions in response to state-imposed costs perform a
more important role in adjusting costs imposed by parochial legislation.
In many situations, substitutions eventually bring enough costs home to
the enacting state to restore efficiency to its lawmaking. Efforts to export
costs to those outside the jurisdiction succeed only temporarily. California's manipulation of the raisin market to raise prices 6 8 presumably generated substitution of other foods for raisins and stimulated competing
165 See European Economic Community, The First Stage of the Common Market 38-43
(1962).
166 See McLure, supra note 161, at 69, 74-75, 80; Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalism: The Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a National Common Market for Energy
Supplies, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 281, 290-95 (1981).
167 See text accompanying note 163 supra.

168 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359 (1943).
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production of raisins and of substitute foods elsewhere. Eventually, California raisin producers bore a significant part of the costs of the state's
169
regulation.
Adjustment always occurs when state laws facially treat local and
border-crossing commerce the same but favor predominantly local products over predominantly imported products. One effect is to stimulate
out-of-state production of the favored product. Another is to stimulate
production of other substitutes everywhere. The same is true for laws
that restrict the form in which business may be done. Even if such state
laws have short-term parochial effects, long-term effects on interstate
commerce may be negligible or may even promote it.
One important limit on market substitution is market power. If a
state and its producers, or a cartel of states, have sufficient control of a
particular natural resource, substitution may be only partial. The same
occurs to a lesser extent when production or developed markets are concentrated in one state. 170 If a state is a large enough importer, its tariffs
are paid partly by producers in exporting states.171
This limit must be qualified in turn. In the short run, substitution
for monopolized resources is only partial. But parochial trade legislation
encourages external producers to discover or invent lower-cost substitutes, so long-term substitution is usually more effective.172 Moreover,
modern technological advances and increases in international trade have
probably improved the effectiveness of substitutions. Perception of this
change may have already contributed to greater judicial deference in cer173
tain dormant commerce power cases.
The most durable form of market power is state control over ports
and trade routes, imposing costs on all commerce in transit through the
jurisdiction. Unless the jurisdiction's territory is very small, substitution
never entirely overcomes government-imposed costs. A state enjoys monopoly power to that extent. Like a private monopolist, it can raise
74
prices and restrict trade.
169 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 602-04; McLure, supra note 161, at 74-75. This proposition is hardly new to modem economics. Taney and Johnson argued it to the Court in
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 432 (1827).
170 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 603-04; Levmore, supra note 161, at 601; Williams,
supra note 166, at 310-11.
171 See M. Kreinin, International Economics 274-76, 302 (3d ed. 1979).
172 See C. McConnell, Economics 594-95 (9th ed. 1984).
173 See, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 288 (1976). The trend of tax
decisions suggests greater reliance on state-versus-state and market competition. See Arkansas
Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 389-93 (1983). A few opinions include express recognition of market adjustments. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981).
174 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 604-05; Brown, supra note 93, at 232; Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 38; Levmore, supra note 161, at 570-72.
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Delay is a second limitation on market substitution. Often it takes a
relatively long time for markets to bring regulatory or tax costs home to
the enacting jurisdiction. Much damage to allocational efficiency and to
interstate commercial harmony may occur in the meantime. 175 Again,
technological advances and greater international integration have probably shortened adjustment times.
A third limit, already mentioned, is the capture of local politics by
concentrated interests. When protectionists are politically ascendant in
all states, allocational efficiency and interstate harmony suffer substantially even though local consumers or other dispersed interests pay most
of the costs. 176 The latter condition is common in international

markets. 177
These complexities show that efforts to measure precisely the degree
to which costs imposed by state laws fall on in-state interests and are
adequately reflected in local political processes would be difficult for an
economics institute, and impossible for a court hearing episodic lawsuits.
But the concept provides a useful rough measure that identifies the kinds
of parochial laws that are likely to export costs and to resist local political discipline. This in turn helps to determine which state has the greatest interest in regulation and taxation and when jurisdiction by more
17 8
than one state is justified.
The interaction among cost exporting, local political restraint, and
the market underlies the important distinction between states' burdens
on their imports or exports, and those on commerce in transit or external
transactions. For import-export commerce, durable cost exporting is unlikely. At least one major party to every transaction is in the state, and
market adjustments often return regulatory costs to the state that imposes them. 179 Import-export regulations cause problems when strong
See McLure, supra note 161, at 76-78.
See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
177 See M. Kreinin, supra note 171, at 306.
178 Cost exporting and local political restraint distinguish the dormant commerce power
doctrine from that of substantive due process. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34 (examining
substantive due process). The commerce power doctrine restrains states only when local politics do not adequately reflect state-imposed costs, and the state has not justified imposing on
outsiders as a class. It is best viewed as restraining interference by one state in other states'
choices among private market ordering and various forms of government regulation. Substantive due process, by contrast, is purely antimajoritarian, assuring a personal right to freedom
from unjustified government interference in private market ordering regardless of the view of
any political majority, local or national. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7,
§ 11.4, at 350-60. For a contrary view that does not distinguish between the two doctrines, see
Farber, supra note 18, at 399; cf. Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 29-30 (arguing that the
doctrines are not very different); Tushnet, supra note 18, at 141-42, 147-50 (arguing that differences between the doctrines are unimportant for constitutional purposes).
179 See text accompanying notes 162-63, 166-73 supra.
175
176
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states with market power exploit the weak, and when local political
processes are captured by organized and concentrated interests. Protectionism is overtly hostile to other states and induces retaliation until protectionists are in control everywhere, to the detriment of all consumers.
By contrast, state regulation and taxation of commerce in transit
through a state, or of other external transactions where buyer and seller
are outside the state, export costs more substantially and permanently.
Few local interests are benefited by trucks, trains, buses, telegraph wires,
or pipelines crossing a state. Market adjustments overcome some costs,
but monopoly power over geographic routes, sunk costs of prior investments, and related factors for other markets allow a significant degree of
permanent cost exporting. Weak local political restraint is straightforward. It corresponds to the self-interest of the state as a whole rather
than to that of local trade associations. Political temptation to extract a
high price for passage is constant over time.
Judicial doctrine reflects this distinction rather clearly. Laws that
regulate solely import-export trade are sustained unless categorically
protectionist. 180 Laws that substantially burden interstate transportation, commerce in transit, or other external markets, by contrast, are
often struck down in an effort to allocate jurisdiction among interested
states or to limit conflicting regulations. 181
C. Curbing Protectionismin State Import-Export Commerce
The dormant commerce power doctrine invalidates states' burdens
on their import-export commerce only for protectionism manifested by
discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce. Other forms of
state parochialism are sustained because the states' interest in importexport regulation is strong, and market and political restraints effectively
curb this type of legislation.
1.

Protectionismand Police Power

Under the dormant commerce power doctrine, a state's interest in
protecting local enterprise against outside competition is never legitimate. Accordingly, Supreme Court decisions outlaw state protectionism.1 82 Protectionism can be effected only by Congress or with its
permission. Congress cannot overtly disadvantage one or a few states, so
IS0 See text accompanying notes 182-204 infra.

181See text accompanying notes 247-331 infra.
182 See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). There are two exceptions to this rule:

when states act as market participants, and when states use justified measures such as
quarantines.
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internal protectionism is to a modest extent curtailed altogether.1 83
Classic protectionism meant shielding domestic producers against
competition from imports.1 8 4 The Court also condemns measures that
protect local buyers rather than producers, and that restrict exports
rather than imports.'8 5 When a law creates a categorical advantage for
an identifiable market group within the state against its external competitors, the law is protectionist and usually struck down.
Laws that suppress interstate or foreign trade without protecting
specific local groups against outside competition can be struck down as
well, but not based on protectionism. Taxation and regulation of interstate transportation enterprises, for example, impose costs on outsiders
for local benefit. They tend to protect local trade to some extent because
they raise overall costs of interstate or foreign trade more than those of
internal commerce. But the principal local advantage is tax revenue or
regulatory gain to persons other than competitors of the burdened class,
purposes that are legitimate uses of police power. 8 6 The Court does not
label such laws protectionist or discriminatory; the words are usually ab1 87
sent from opinions in these cases.
The distinction between protectionist and police-power purposes is
clear at the extremes but murky on the margin. Many laws have both
protectionist and police-power purposes and effects. State laws are
88
struck down only when categorically protectionist or nearly so.'
183 The Constitution expressly requires that federal taxes and duties be "uniform"
thoughout the nation and forbids federal preferences of the ports of one state over those of
another. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. § 9. The Court gives Congress broad latitude under
these provisions, sustaining reasonable geographic distinctions. See United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74, 84-86 (1983) (finding that uniformity clause does not bar tax that advantages one
state). But deliberate disadvantage of one state was struck down in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (1911). Of course, nothing precludes Congress from authorizing protectionism in particular industries. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 433-38 (1946).
184 See I A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 452-72
(1976).
185 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 597-600 (1923).
186 This definition of police power does not accord with definitions that omit taxes. And
many definitions of police power would include the protectionist laws that are contrasted here.
But this definition is occasionally employed by the Court in dormant commerce power cases.
See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 427-29 (1963).
Compare the uses of "police power" in takings cases. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (sustaining city's prohibition of brickyards as valid exercise of police
power).
187 But see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680, 685-86 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring), discussed in notes 297-300 and accompanying text infra.
188 See notes 189, 221-46 and accompanying text infra.
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CategoricalDiscriminationAgainst Interstate or Foreign Commerce

The Court outlaws protectionism in import-export commerce
through its antidiscrimination rule. The rule presumes the invalidity of
state laws that categorically discriminate against interstate or foreign
commerce. 189 The rule was probably induced by classic protectionist devices that shielded local enterprise from external competition: tariffs, embargoes, and quotas. 190
The antidiscrimination rule covers only laws that favor local inter-

ests over their direct external competitors. In other words, it largely corresponds with protectionism. Costs imposed uniformly on interests that
happen in fact to be mostly outside the state, or multiple or conflict burdens on interstate or foreign commerce, are not categorically protection-

ist; when such "police power" laws are challenged, the Court describes
them as "nondiscriminatory" and reviews them under its nexus, apportionment, and balancing tests. 191
Laws that categorically discriminate are seldom justified because
1 92
their predominant purpose and effect are almost always protectionist.
To sustain categorical discrimination, a state must show that its law effectively abates external costs or other market failures particularly associated with movement into or out of the state. In other words, it must
show that a legitimate state purpose cannot be achieved by nondiscriminatory means.19 3 This rule can be criticized as overbroad because there
are always less burdensome means to carry out state objectives. But this
would misapply the rule to nondiscriminatory cases. The rule applies

only to state efforts to justify categorical discrimination against interstate
189 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979).
190 The Court's first references to discrimination against interstate commerce appear to be
Justice Miller's dicta in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 138, 140 (1869) and
Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 151-53 (1869). Justice Miller expressly distinguished
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), as a case based on discrimination and by
implication distinguished Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) and Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861). See Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 138-40. The discrimination concept was not articulated in Brown, Crandall,or Almy, but it was clearly raised by
the appellee in Woodruff, see 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 127-30, and addressed by the Court, see id. at
138. After Woodruff, the discrimination concept came into common usage. See, e.g., Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279-81 (1876) (invalidating license tax on dealers in goods produced
out of state); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 432 (1871) (finding that license statute
for nonresident traders violated privileges and immunities clause).
191See notes 247-331 and accompanying text infra. A few facially nondiscriminatory laws
have been struck down as protectionist in effect. See notes 216-24, 325-31 and accompanying
text infra. On a few occasions, however, the Court has strayed into broader definitions of
discrimination in reviewing "police power" laws. See notes 282-89 and accompanying text
infra.
192 But see text accompanying notes 332-69 infra (at least some subsidies are excepted from
antiprotectionism rule).
193 E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
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or foreign commerce. So limited, it works quite well. Reasonable
quarantines and inspections are legitimate grounds for discriminating
against import commerce; 194 temporary public emergencies justify restricting exports. 195
Some discriminatory laws do not immediately gain market advantage for anyone within the state against outside competitors and, thus,
are not overtly protectionist. For example, tariffs or regulations imposed
on imported goods that have no direct local competitors have legitimate
purposes such as public revenue or other more widely distributed state
benefits.196 These laws are nevertheless invalid when they discriminate
categorically. 19 7 They seek advantage for locals over those outside the
state, inviting retaliatory regulation of other products, and they create an
incentive for protected local competition to arise or for outside producers
to move operations into the state. Protectionism in these instances is
potential rather than actual, but it would be complicated for courts to
identify those cases in which potential protectionism is likely to become
actual. More important, legitimate state purposes involved can be as
readily achieved by nondiscriminatory laws; the discriminatory feature of
19 8
such laws simply serves no legitimate purpose.
The Court's antidiscrimination rule has considerable practical utility. The rule treats all states alike, is reasonably certain of application,
generates direct welfare gains, and does little harm to important state
autonomy interests. When commercial regulations or taxes are complex,
the antidiscrimination rule focuses on a particular feature of the statutory scheme. It corresponds closely with governing policy considera194 See, e.g., id. (upholding law prohibiting importation of baitfish). The Court expresses

this exception more colorfully in the case of the privileges and immunities clause: discrimination against nonresidents is justified when they "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at
which the statute is aimed." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1947).
195 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1981) (dictum). This
exception was mentioned during the original debates on the commerce clause. See 3 Records
of the Federal Convention, supra note 30, at 607.
196 The same is true of export tariffs or regulations imposed on goods that are all exported,
although these are rare. Regarding impositions on goods that are mostly exported, see text
accompanying notes 236-46 infra.
197 See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268-73 (1984) (excise tax on
liquor). For foreign imports, this is an obvious violation of the import-export clause. See,
e.g., Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 569-70 (1878) (sales tax discriminated against imported goods).
198 By contrast, the Court sustains nondiscriminatory laws that impose on goods produced
out of state. Because there are no local competitors to protect, such laws have no protectionist
effects on present markets, and they serve legitimate state purposes. Requiring nondiscriminatory form guards against future protectionism. Accordingly, states structure taxation and regulation of commerce in these goods as facially nondiscriminatory laws. A prominent example
is heavy taxation and regulation of tobacco products. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S.
105 (1932) (upholding ban on advertising of tobacco products); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S.
343 (1900) (sustaining ban on cigarette sales).
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tions. The concept of discrimination focuses precisely on special costs
imposed on goods crossing the state's borders. The rule leaves states
broad discretion to regulate local commerce; legitimate state purposes
can almost always be achieved by rules that are not categorically discriminatory. 199 Discrimination is a reliable indicator of protectionism because both concepts are defined as treating directly competing local and
out-of-state interests differently. The rule's two exceptions-for states as
market participants and for quarantines and related public emergencies-are logical and reasonably easy to apply.2°° These factors probably
account for its relative popularity; many critics of other dormant power
20 1
rules approve of this one.
Cost exporting is not an essential consideration in applying the antidiscrimination rule. State laws that discriminate against commerce
moving into or out of the state export some but not all costs imposed;
disadvantaged outsiders share costs with their customers or suppliers in
the state. Since market adjustments return costs to the regulating state in
the long run, costs are often not exported at all.2 02 Cost exporting is
more long-lived when the regulating state has significant market power,
that is, when a strong state exploits weak states.
Although protectionist laws do not effectively export costs, they are
overtly hostile to other states and establish favored local interests. When
benefited interests are concentrated and organized, they often capture local political control, particularly when ultimate losers are local consumers. 20 3 Even when markets bring government-imposed costs home,
interest group politics maintain protectionist laws. Inertial effects of
American lawmaking processes further lock in parochialism. 2 04 Protectionist politics invite retaliatory protectionism by other states, until protectionists dominate in all states at great cost to both interstate
199 This statement ignores an important practical factor. Discriminatory rules are politically easier to enact; a nondiscriminatory alternative may not get enough support. A prominent example was the law prohibiting importation of waste originating out of state in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), which could not have been passed in nondiscriminatory form. This sort of parochial state interest, depending entirely on beggar-thyneighbor politics, ought to be disregarded.
200 See text accompanying notes 194-95 supra, 332-69 infra.
201 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 18, at 438-43; Tushnet, supra note 18, at 130-41, 163-65. But
see Brown, supra note 93, at 224-25 (criticizing overly simplistic applications of discrimination
concept).
202 See text accompanying notes 168-73, 178-79 supra.
203 See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
204 See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 121-23 (1982). In a parliamentary system, by contrast, sweeping reductions in government-maintained protectionism
may be effectuated very rapidly. See Lohr, New Zealand Tries Free Market Stand, N.Y.
Times, June 10, 1985, at D8; Shaw & Stroup, New Zealand's Free Market Experiment, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 17.
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commercial harmony and allocational efficiency.
3. Problems in Defining Discrimination
Varying definitions of discrimination occasionally cause confusion
in applying the antidiscrimination standard. A few aberrant jurists and
academics have replaced discrimination against interstate or foreign

commerce with personal discrimination against nonresident merchants, a
concept that if fairly applied would probably cause the Court to invali20 5
date more state laws.
A second definitional issue arises when states attempt to justify an
overtly discriminatory law on the ground that the burden compensates
for other governmental costs the state imposes on local competitors. The
Court accepts this "complementary burden" justification when in-state
costs are the same or very similar to those imposed on import-export
commerce, so that a discrete scheme is not protectionist. The best
known cases are those sustaining compensating use taxes. 20 6 But the

Court has rejected broader attempts to justify discriminatory taxes or

20 7
regulations by reference to different impositions on locals.
Some scholars argue that the Court has been too lenient in sustaining sales and compensating use tax schemes because use taxes disadvantage certain classes of outside merchants depending on local tax
structures in other states and because they stifle interstate price
208
competition.
Supporters of the Court's view have the better argument. 2°9 Sales

205 For a discussion of the personal rights theory of the dormant commerce power doctrine,
see notes 397-416 and accompanying text infra. Within the Court, this concept has mostly
been confined to dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339, 34445 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
136-45 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 820-21 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206 See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-86 (1937); see also Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954-56 (1982); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286
U.S. 472, 480-81 (1932); Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 152-53 (1869); Hellerstein,
Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 Tax
Law. 405 (1986). When the burden imposed by use taxes is greater than that imposed by the
local sales taxes, the scheme is protectionist in its impact on private markets and is invalid.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 71-74 (1963).
Another common form of compensating tax is the tax on transportation companies "in
lieu" of local property taxes. See Hellerstein, supra, at 420-22. But this form of tax does not
categorically discriminate against interstate commerce.
207 See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2816-20
(1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 758-59 (1981).
208 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 605-07; Brown, supra note 93, at 233-37.
209 See 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 143 ("[T]he holdings of the cases are beyond
criticism.").
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and compensating use tax schemes are not categorically protectionist in
their impact on private markets; states seek to neutralize advantages for
out-of-state competitors created by their domestic taxes. Taxes collected
pay for governmental services consumed by interstate commerce, and it
should pay its share. Policy reasons in favor of use taxes are akin to
those allowing protectionist subsidies: the schemes impose heavily on
enacting states' voters so that local political restraint is strong, and a
contrary rule would curtail useful state undertakings. 2 10 Those condemning the schemes implicitly rely on a substantive preference for laissez faire, while the Court's focus is on state interference in the affairs of
other states.
On the other side, these decisions have been criticized as overly intrusive because the Court does not allow states enough leeway in justifying taxes that facially discriminate against interstate commerce.2 1 1 The
question is whether interstate taxpayers challenging a tax must prove
that their goods are actually taxed more than local competitors', or
whether it is sufficient to prove potentially higher levies. The majority's
benchmark is potential discrimination. Its test requires that if all states
imposed the challenged tax, there would be "no impermissible interference with free trade. '2 12 This vague test oversimplifies analysis, although
2 13
its results are defensible.
A third area of difficulty is various attempts to distinguish between
210 See notes 347, 350-56 and accompanying text infra.
211 See Tyler, 107 S. Ct. at 2823 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Armco, 467 U.S. at 646 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed:
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat from Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W.
Va. L. Rev. 723 (1985); Lathrop, Armco--A Narrow and Puzzling Test for Discriminatory
State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 Taxes 551 (1985).
212 Tyler, 107 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Armco, 467 U.S. at 644-45). Dissenters would require
external challengers to prove that they actually paid higher taxes than local competitors. See
Tyler, 107 S.Ct. at 2823-26 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Armco, 467
U.S. at 646-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
213 The test is not a useful predictor because it does not answer the question of what is an
"impermissible interference with free trade." The Court must determine whether domestic
taxes and those levied on interstate commerce are sufficiently alike so that an apparently discriminatory scheme is not protectionist. In Tyler and Armco, state laws that imposed both
production and wholesaling taxes measured by a percentage of gross value were held not substantially equivalent. See Tyler, 107 S. Ct. at 2817-21; Armco, 467 U.S. at 642-43. But these
two events are not very distinct. Goods produced and immediately sold are, from the taxpayer's perspective, taxed twice at the same time and in the same way.
However, the dissenters' view offers worse problems. Some challengers would meet the
test when their home states imposed the same tax as the importing state. Other states would
have an incentive to conform to the system by taxing competitively, a competition that would
be dominated by more powerful states. Also, the complementary tax defense must stop somewhere; courts cannot review the impact of a state's entire legal code on commerce. The majority's rule for this defense is confined to categorical discrimination, is reasonably manageable
and predictable, and undoubtedly curbs protectionism and furthers interstate trade.
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facial discrimination and discriminatory effect, an effort that occasionally
becomes tangled with a search for discriminatory or protectionist intent. 2 14 This confusion probably derives from attempts to analogize commerce clause law to equal protection standards, particularly those of the
heightened scrutiny variety. The effort is mistaken. Racial or other suspect discrimination is itself a constitutional wrong. The commerce
clause antidiscrimination rule is instrumental to carrying out the policy
prohibiting protectionism. Actual impact on trade is what matters for
judicial scrutiny under the commerce clause. This does not depend on
whether discrimination against external competitors is facial or purposeful, but whether it is categorical. When all benefited parties are
within the state and all burdened direct competitors are outside, a local
law imposes categorical discrimination, of which tariffs and embargoes
are paradigm examples. This is equally protectionist whether discrimination appears on the face of the law or requires account of other facts.
The definition of discrimination is straightforward when the law at
issue is one of uniform statewide application, but local ordinances have
generated some controversy. A local law that favors those within the
city or county over those outside it burdens some direct competitors
within the same state. The Court has properly treated these laws as categorically discriminatory and protectionist. 21 5 These laws have the same
tendency toward economic isolation as a statewide tariff. In theory, competitors outside the city but within the state provide some political check
on protectionism. In practice, however, it is likely that their influence is
channeled into creating similar trade duchies in their own cities or counties. Moreover, all protectionist legislation benefits only favored classes
of locals over outside competitors and over local consumers or other unorganized groups. There is no reason why cities or other local governments should be excepted from the antidiscrimination rule because of instate losers.
The Court's decision in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison 21 6 illustrates both the definition of categorical discrimination and its application
to local ordinances. In Dean Milk, a city ordinance did not distinguish
on its face between local and interstate commerce; it burdened all nonlocal milk producers, within and without the state. 2 17 The Court never214 See, e.g., Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 Calif. L. Rev.
1203, 1239-52 (1986). On protectionist intent, see text accompanying notes 430-75 infra.
215 See notes 216-19 and accompanying text infra.
For another variant, see Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 164, 174-75 (1985) (validating "regional" discrimination in favor of
banks in state and in five neighboring states based on federal statutory authority).
216 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
217 The ordinance prohibited the sale of milk produced more than twenty-five miles from
the city and barred the sale of pasteurized milk that was not pasteurized at a local plant. Id. at
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theless held that it discriminated against interstate commerce. 2 18 This
result was correct because the ordinance, like a tariff, categorically discriminated against interstate commerce.
Likewise, the Court has consistently struck down state and local
"drummer" taxes on local agents of outside producers. 2 19 These did not
facially discriminate against imports, but had precisely the same effect as
tariffs. Categorical discrimination against interstate commerce was obvious. However, the Court in the drummer cases described the wrong as
discriminatory effect. This invited confusion with very different cases involving only partial, rather than categorical, discrimination against inter220
state commerce.

4. PartialDiscrimination
State laws that are not categorically discriminatory are also struck
down if they are predominantly protectionist. In these cases, a state law

favors locals in its practical effect, but also benefits some outsiders.
When only import-export commerce is involved, the Court evaluates

protectionism under its balancing test.221 The state must show that its
law reasonably effectuates a nonprotectionist ("legitimate") purpose.
States usually prevail on the protectionism norm; invalidation under this
standard alone is rare. 222
350-51.
218 Id. at 356. In H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court invalidated a state's denial of a milk export license that protected a local market from competition
both inside and outside the state. Hood well illustrates the ineffectiveness of political restraint
within the same state to curb local protectionism; a statewide law was at issue, but it was
administered for local protection. The opinion was ambiguous about discrimination. See
Hood, 336 U.S. at 531, 539. But in later cases, the Court has cited Hood for its discussion of
discriminatory commercial regulation. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
219 See, e.g., West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957);
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Asher v. Texas, 128
U.S. 129 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); see also 1 J.
Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 140.
220 Confusion between categorical and partial discrimination deprives the discrimination
rule of its useful precision because many state taxes and regulations have at least some partially
discriminatory effects. The Court cannot eliminate all such effects without imposing a unitary
national system of regulation. This confusion has not affected any Court holding in an importexport case, but it has affected at least one opinion striking down multiple tax burdens on
interstate transportation. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987),
discussed in text accompanying notes 282-89 infra.
Some scholars define discrimination to include partially discriminatory effects, thus characterizing cases that the Court views as nondiscriminatory as posing issues of discrimination.
See, e.g., Eule, supra note 18, at 461-74.
221 See note 122 supra.
222 Most invalidations of laws that do not discriminate categorically involve laws that burden commerce in transit or external transactions, as well as import-export commerce. See
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One of the few modem invalidations under this rule was Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,223 in which the Court
struck down a North Carolina apple-labeling law that had the "discriminatory effect" of favoring local apple growers over those in some but not
all other states. 224 Although the opinion did not note the important difference in impact on trade between partial discrimination and categorical, but nonfacial, discrimination, Hunt surely was correctly decided.
The discrimination was practically categorical. This sort of law should
be invalidated to prevent easy technical avoidance of the rule against categorical discrimination.
The Court usually sustains state regulations that partially discriminate against state imports or exports. Such burdens on imports commonly arise in two circumstances. One is when a state law burdens a
product that is mostly made outside the state to the benefit of a competing but different product made within.225 The other is when a state requires that business be transacted in a form that favors local firms. 226 In
both situations, burdened outside sellers claim to be victims of discrimination. Moreover, they can often show evidence of parochial legislative
purpose. But the Court calls these laws nondiscriminatory and upholds
them.
This policy is not logically compelled. It would be rational to define
forbidden discrimination to encompass favoritism for local products over
imports that are substitutes but not direct competitors, and for forms of
selling most convenient for local businesses. But the Court wisely has
not done so for two reasons: market corrections effectively limit the burden on interstate commerce, and judicial invalidation would substantially
impair important state autonomy interests.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 227 is an example of localproduct favoritism. The Court sustained an environmental law that favored paper milk containers over plastic ones. At the time, Minnesota
produced no disfavored plastic, paper was a major local industry, and
notes 270-331 and accompanying text infra.

223 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
224 Id. at 351-52. The Court said that it did not need to decide whether the law was passed
with protectionist intent, id. at 352, but it based its decision on a finding of discrimination. See
id. at 350-53; see also Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 474, 391
N.E.2d 716, 721 (1979) (invalidating tax on coal because of "discriminatory effect"); cf.
Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 470 F. Supp. 401, 408-09 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (finding that tax involved
in Lindley constituted invalid "protectionism").
225 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (sustaining environmental law favoring paper milk containers over plastic ones where paper was a major local
industry).
226 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (sustaining prohibition of retail gasoline sales by oil producers and refiners).
227 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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there were trial court findings that these facts had influenced the legislature.2 28 The Court determined that the environmental purpose was not a
sham, but it would not probe the legislative judgment that the two products differed in relevant ways. 229 Long-term economic effects of this kind
of parochialism are uncertain. Minnesota's line drawing helped the pa230
per industry in all states, not just at home.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland23 1 illustrates valid state regulation of the form of doing business. Maryland prohibited retail gasoline

sales by vertically integrated oil companies. At the time, all burdened
sellers were outside the state, and most benefited competitors were local. 232 In sustaining the regulation, the Court relied in part upon the
state's legitimate interest in deterring preferential retailing by big oil
companies. 233 Again, long-term market effects were uncertain. Out-ofstate firms that operated retail gasoline stations were stimulated to invest
in Maryland, and interstate capital allocation may have wound up very
234
much as it was before regulation.

Product differentiations and rules on how selling may be done, even

when parochial, are based on current market conditions. Market adjustments change these conditions, sometimes rapidly, restoring market discipline to the state's political process. The Court's concern is with
permanent, less adventitious discrimination. Categorical discrimination
Id. at 460, 463 n.7, 473.
See id. at 465-70. Compare Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919) (sustaining ban on
condensed skimmed milk that was intended to prevent fraud on consumer) and Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (sustaining ban on yellow margarine in order to prevent
consumer confusion) with Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30 (1898) (striking down requirement that margarine be colored pink). In Hebe and Plumley, the states offered plausible
police power purposes; in Collins, New Hampshire did not.
230 Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 473.
231 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
232 Id. at 123, 125-26.
233 Id. at 124-25.
234 In Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980), the Court struck down Florida's
ban on certain investment firms with principal operations outside the state. Unlike the statute
in Exxon, the Florida statute was not evenhanded; it discriminated categorically in favor of
local enterprises, against out-of-state competitors. Id. at 42.
"Green River" ordinances forbidding all door-to-door selling have been sustained because
they further residential privacy, safety, and quiet, despite resulting advantages to local retailers. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 638-41 (1951). By suppressing door-todoor selling, these ordinances stimulate mail-order selling as well as local retailing, and they do
not favor local goods over imported goods.
The Court has also sustained state regulations that prefer sellers serving small-scale as
well as large-scale customers, even though it may be easier for local firms to do so. See, e.g.,
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951); Tuscan
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Barber, 45 N.Y.2d 215, 225-28, 408 N.Y.S.2d 348, 354-56, 380 N.E.2d
179, 185-87, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978). Taxes have been validly graduated according to business size. See, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 541-42
(1931).
228
229
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resists market adjustments, while partially discriminatory effects are susceptible to change.
Genuine attacks on spill-over costs rarely justify categorical discrimination but often require line drawing that has partially discriminatory
effects. Nevertheless, more aggressive judicial intervention is inappropriate because it would severely hamper legitimate state interests. States
wanting to suppress commodities thought to be bad, such as "controlled
substances," tobacco products, or throw-away beverage containers,
would have to justify such "discrimination." As a result, courts might
allow one state to suppress imports of a local product, while prohibiting
others from pursuing similar policies. For example, it would have been
odd to deny Maryland a regulation that was plainly valid in other states
235
that had local gasoline production.
The Court also sustains state laws that particularly burden export
products. When a state and its producers have market power over supply of a resource that is mostly exported, state-imposed costs are largely
exported, at least in the short run. 236 States have often taken this opportunity to shift costs beyond their borders. California's restriction of raisin supplies, 237 Oklahoma's limits on natural gas production, 238
Montana's thirty percent coal severance tax, 239 and Pennsylvania's anthracite coal tax 240 are famous examples of laws that succeeded, at least
temporarily, in exporting most of the costs imposed.
The Court rightly refused to invalidate them for several reasons.
One already mentioned is that these laws are not categorically protectionist because benefited locals are not competitors of burdened outsiders. Therefore, long-term market adjustments reduce cost exporting and
improve local political accountability. 241 Also, by prohibiting categorical
discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, the Court imposes
some political restraint.
Another reason to sustain these laws is the states' important, legiti235 See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128 n.18 (naming four other jurisdictions with similar laws).
236 See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 134, at 603-04; Levmore, supra note 161, at 617-18.
Similarly, when a state constitutes a large part of the market consuming a product that is
largely imported, taxes on that product will be partly exported to outside producers. See notes
170-71 and accompanying text supra. When a developed market or industry is concentrated in
one state, it has some market power to tax imports and exports, limited by the threat of external competition or migration of the industry. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (invalidating tax that favored in-state transfers of securities in
New York); Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907) (upholding tax on stock transfers made in
New York as applied to intrastate transactions).
237 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
238 See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
239 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
240 See Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
241 See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra.
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mate interests in regulating and taxing local production. The Court has
no sound way to measure the extent of legitimate interests, so it cannot
define how much state taxation or regulation is too much. 242
A third reason to uphold these laws is the normative judgment that
natural advantages belong to the people of the state. Therefore, it is
proper for state residents to enjoy their benefits. 24 3 One may disagree
with the Court's application of this value from either a state or national
perspective. The Court's doctrine may be criticized as insufficiently deferential to state interests because states are not allowed to exploit their
geographic location 244 or to discriminate with respect to resources. 245 Or
the Court may be criticized as too generous to states because much state
resource wealth was conferred gratis by the federal government. 2 46 The
Court's rule, however, is reasonable because it invalidates only laws in
which the enacting state's interest and political restraint are weak.
D.

CurbingBurdens on Commerce in Transit
and External Transactions

1.

Allocating Jurisdiction

State laws that are not categorically discriminatory impose greater
costs on interstate or foreign commerce than on local trade whenever
more than one state regulates or taxes and multiple or conflict burdens
result.2 47 When such laws burden a state's import-export commerce,
their effects are partially protectionist because local businesses bear lower
costs than out-of-state competitors. The extent of protectionist impact is
a relevant factor in determining validity. But because these costs arise
from states pursuing legitimate police power purposes, there is no presumption of invalidity as there is for categorical discrimination. The dormant commerce power doctrine limits these costs only when they
significantly burden commerce in transit through the enacting state or
commerce occurring essentially outside it.248 In these circumstances, the
242 See Hellerstein, supra note 18, at 45-63; Regan, supra note 18, at 1173; Williams, supra
note 166, at 299-309. See generally 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 151-65 (discussing taxes
on natural resources sold out of state). As the Court has noted, the degree to which the
burdens of these laws are actually exported would be very difficult to measure satisfactorily.
See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 628; id. at 651 & n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 & n.1 (1980).
244 See text accompanying notes 179-81 supra and 270-75 infra.
245 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 595-600 (1923). Chief Justice Rehnquist's
votes in resources cases may be based on this argument. See note 495 and accompanying text
infra. Regarding state-owned resources, see notes 337, 357-58 and accompanying text infra.
246 See Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 556-57 &
557 n.238 (1981).
247 See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
248 As previously explained, this statement must be qualified to recognize the invalidity of a
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to other
state laws seriously interfere in matters of primary concern
249
states, and political and market restraints are ineffective.
To limit multiple and conflict burdens on commerce in transit and
external transactions, the Court allocates jurisdiction to the states with
the strongest interest. However, the Court's opinions do not refer directly to the concept of allocation of jurisdiction; it is an analytical description of what the Court does. Allocation is carried out under the
Court's standard tests for taxes and for regulations. The tax test requires
apportionment of taxing jurisdiction among interested states, so that the
overall burden on interstate commerce is comparable to that on intrastate commerce.2 50 Another part of the tax test denies taxing jurisdiction
251
to states lacking an adequate nexus with the transaction or taxpayer.
The effect of this requirement is to allocate taxing jurisdiction to a state
or states with an adequate nexus. The Court's balancing test for regulations, on the other hand, says nothing about either allocation or nexus,
but in fact the test is applied to deny jurisdiction to states with insuffi252
cient interest, that is, for lack of an adequate nexus.
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the two basic forms that the allocation remedy takes: unitary allocation, which confines jurisdiction to one state, and
apportionment of taxing jurisdiction among several states. Section 3 also
explains the relevance of states' claims for compensation for services provided to, or for costs imposed by, interstate commerce. Sections 4 and 5
discuss application of the allocation principle in two important areas:
transportation and commerce in transit, and state regulation of external
markets.
While the Court's rulings improve allocational efficiency, their essential aim is to protect policy choices of the states with the greatest
interest in a transaction from interference by other states. If the most
interested states elect not to tax or regulate, their laissez-faire decisions
are not undercut by other states.
When the dormant commerce power doctrine succeeds in allocating
authority to the state or states most strongly interested in a subject, efficiency is improved in another way. The state most strongly interested is
usually the state in which costs of regulation principally fall, and its local
253
political process then restrains excessively burdensome legislation.
few protectionist laws that are not quite categorically discriminatory, but are practically so.
See text accompanying notes 223-24 supra.
249 See text accompanying notes 159-63, 174 supra.
250 E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); see also text accompanying notes 264-69 infra (discussing apportionment requirement).
251 E.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
252 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
253 See text accompanying notes 156-63 supra.
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Unitary Allocation

Many state regulations and tax laws are subject to unitary allocation; the Court confines jurisdiction to the state with the strongest interest in the subject matter. When this is done, multiple and conflict
burdens that would arise if two or more states had jurisdiction are prevented. The Court precludes jurisdiction of other states on the basis of
insufficient interest, as expressed in several distinct rules.2 5 4 Taxing jurisdiction is denied for lack of nexus. 255 Judicial jurisdiction is denied
under the due process clause for lack of "minimum contacts. 2 56 Jurisdiction to require foreign corporations to qualify to do local business is
denied when they do exclusively interstate commerce.2 57 Jurisdiction to
tax ships has been precluded under the "home port rule," limiting property taxes to a ship's principal home.25 8 Regulatory jurisdiction is precluded under the Court's balancing test.2 59 That test also allocates
taxing jurisdiction in foreign commerce, where the Court has no power
26 °
to apportion.
The Court is likely to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to one state
when buyer and seller are both located there, 26 1 or the state confines its
254 A state may have sufficient interest for one kind of jurisdiction but not for another over
the same person or corporation. For example, states can at times tax foreign corporations that
they cannot require to qualify to do local business. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419
U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jurisdiction to tax is accorded greater deference because the mediate remedy of apportionment reduces multiple burdens, the state's interest in taxing is always important, and local political restraint on taxes is usually more effective
than it is on regulations.
255 The Court has rested decisions on both the commerce clause and the due process clause.
See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756-60 (1967) (no jurisdiction to impose sales tax on
mail-order seller with no agents or property in the state); see also 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1982)
(denying state power to impose net income tax on sellers that merely solicit orders in state).
Use of the term "allocation" seems to have originated in the tax field. See 1 J. Hellerstein,
supra note 145, at 328 n.95. But at least one scholar has used the term allocation to describe
only what is now called apportionment. See Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 561, 570-71 (1954).
256 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also Davis v. Farmers Coop.
Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315-17 (1923) (commerce clause barred nonresident's state court suit
against corporation when corporation's only contact with state was presence of local soliciting
agents).
257 See Allenberg Cotton, 419 U.S. at 33; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S.
276, 278-79 (1961).
258 See 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 128-32. For a short period, airplanes may have
been subject to the same rule. See id. at 132-34. The Court now requires apportionment for
both. See id.
259 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-39 (1982); see note 122 supra; notes 302-17 and
accompanying text infra.
260 See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979).
261 See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 641-43 (invalidating takeover regulation that directly interfered
with interstate transactions).
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imposition to a distinctly local aspect of an interstate transaction, 262 or

the state's regulations and taxes specifically address the local costs of a
regulated business. 263 In these respects, unitary allocation resembles the
tax requirement of apportionment: the effect of unitary allocation is to
"apportion" different parts of an interstate transaction to different states.
3.

Tax Apportionment

When more than one state has a sufficient nexus to an interstate
transaction or business, multiple taxation is avoided by requiring apportionment. Each state must limit its tax on an interstate transaction or
business to a fraction of the tax it imposes on an intrastate transaction or
business, based on the proportion of the taxed activity occurring in the
state. 264 Taxes commonly apportioned include income taxes on interstate firms and property taxes on instrumentalities of interstate transportation. Income taxes are apportioned according to the percentage of a
firm's sales and other activities in the taxing state. 265 Property taxes are
266
apportioned based on time present or miles traveled in the taxing state.
The apportionment requirement for nondiscriminatory taxes necessarily accords states discretion to select an apportionment formula. This

avoids judicial prescription of uniform national apportionment rules.
Any reasonable basis for apportionment protects a formula against facial

attack, and applications are invalid only in cases of extreme disproporHowever, the Court's deference probably varies according to the
subject of a tax. Most modem apportionment cases have challenged
state income taxes on enterprises doing in-state business. 26 8 The state's
interest in the subject is strong, local political restraint is effective, and
interstate competition for investment restrains state excesses. Exact aption.267

262 See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 719-20
(1972) (upholding service charge for improvement and maintenance of airport).
263 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
264 See, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661-63 (1948); Watson,
Allocation of Business Income for State Income Tax Purposes, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 851, 879-914
(1941). The Court has held that apportionment is required by both the commerce clause and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
265 See, e.g., ContainerCorp., 463 U.S. at 169-71, 180-84 (upholding apportionment formula
for income tax on multinational corporation with foreign subsidiaries); Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (sustaining apportionment formula).
266 See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (sustaining apportioned tax); cf. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (invalidating state
tax on property owned abroad under foreign commerce clause because Court was powerless to
correct resulting multiple taxation by apportioning tax among nations).
267 See Hellerstein, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, in 2
Courts and Free Markets 451, 451-53 (1982). For an exhaustive treatment of methods of
apportionment and of tax allocation, see 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 297-706.
268 See, e.g., Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159.
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portionment of income taxes is difficult anyway. Under these circumstances, the Court is quite right to defer generously to state
apportionment formulas.
Apportionment of taxes on interstate transportation, the subject of
many earlier Court precedents, 269 may warrant more active judicial review. The state's interest is less important, costs are more readily exported, local political restraint is weaker, and interstate competition is
reduced by monopoly power over trade routes and related factors. Moreover, more accurate apportionment is feasible.
4.

Transportationand Commerce in Transit

The most important application of the allocation principle is to limit
multiple and conflict burdens that states impose on commerce in transit.
In their impact on border-crossing commerce, such laws are not protectionist because they do not benefit local competitors of burdened enterprises. Rather, states seek valid police power objectives: revenue, safer
and less congested highways or railroads, cleaner air, less noise, noncompetive jobs for residents. But multiple costs and conflicting rules result,
and unique geographic location gives states monopoly power to extract
high prices from goods or passengers in transit. 270 The strategic city
astride a trade route exacting tribute from all who pass has been with us
since ancient times. 271 It is no coincidence that many prominent cases
272
have arisen in places with favorable geography.
When state laws impose heavily on goods passing through the state,
they interfere in transactions of primary concern to the states importing
and exporting those goods. Cost exporting is substantial and durable.
Few local interests benefit from trucks, trains, buses, telegraph wires, or
pipelines crossing a state, or from the goods they carry. Market adjustments overcome some costs, but monopoly power over geographic routes
allows a significant degree of permanent cost exporting. Because almost
the whole state benefits from impositions on commerce in transit, local
269 See, e.g., Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920); text accompanying notes 276-89 infra;
see also 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 126-34 (discussing current approach to commerce
clause); id. at 632-54 (discussing transportation companies).
270 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 604-05. This observation also applies to communications enterprises that are location-specific. However, new fiberoptic and satellite technology
has reduced state power to exploit communications in transit.
271 See, e.g., C. Oman, The Byzantine Empire 4-6 (1892) (discussing commercial control of
Bosporus by Byzantium).
272 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (highways through Illinois);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (railways through Arizona);
Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873) (railways and waterways through
Pennsylvania); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852)
(bridge over Ohio River); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (steamboat monopoly in New York waterways).
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political restraint is ineffective to moderate the temptation to extract a
high price for passage.
Judicial protection of commerce in transit cannot be carried out
under simple legal rules. The antidiscrimination rule applies, but after
judicial enforcement of that rule for more than a century, most costs that
state governments impose on transportation do not categorically discriminate against interstate commerce generally or against commerce in
transit. In addition, nondiscriminatory laws typically impose costs on
transportation enterprises that conduct import-export and local commerce as well as commerce in transit. Although laws may primarily burden commerce in transit, 273 their effect is rarely, if ever, limited to
commerce in transit.
Laws that demand higher costs from transportation than from other
businesses have partially protectionist effects. Higher transportation
costs reduce competition from distant suppliers and customers in proportion to their distance from markets. On the other hand, transportation
firms should pay their fair share of local taxes, and states have legitimate
health, safety, environmental, and other concerns that can be met only
by restrictions that fall heavily on transportation. Moreover, the Court
must not deter states from providing transportation facilities and improving their infrastructure by restricting their just claims for payment.
These conflicts are a central dilemma of dormant commerce power
law. On the one hand, multiple and conflict burdens on transportation
impose heavy costs, exploit monopoly power over movement of goods
through a state, protect local producers and customers by raising the
shipping costs of their distant competitors, and are poorly disciplined by
loca politics. On the other hand, federal law should not create a preferential status for the transportation industry and other national and international firms. Since the Court cannot achieve precise balance between
these interests, its rules inevitably give the benefit of doubt either to state
autonomy or to interstate movement. For many decades, the tilt favored
interstate enterprise under categorical rules forbidding direct burdens on
interstate commerce or any state regulation of subjects that required national uniformity. The balance has shifted in favor of state autonomy in
close cases. The modem Court also leaves more to market adjustment. 274 As the Court pulled back, Congress enacted some statutory re275
strictions on state taxes.
273 See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 543 & n.3 (1950) (tax on
vehicles); Southern Pac Co., 325 U.S. at 771-72 (train-length law that burdened primarily
interstate commerce); State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 233-34 (freight tax on railroads
that burdened primarily commerce in transit).
274 But see text accompanying notes 282-89 infra.
275 See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, §§ 101-104, 73 Stat. 555, 555-56 (codified
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a. Taxes.
The Court's tax tests apportion jurisdiction to tax
transportation so that interstate commerce pays taxes that are comparable to those levied on local firms. A specific application of the nexus rule
27 6
prohibits ad valorem taxes on goods in transit.

The thorniest issue posed by state taxation of interstate transportation arises from state claims for payment for governmental services rendered. This is a formal balancing factor in the Court's tax validity
test, 277 but it has been misunderstood. It has no application to purely

2 78
import-export cases, which turn on protectionism or discrimination.
Rather, the payment factor applies in cases when a nondiscriminatory
law imposes on commerce in transit, and the state argues that its law is
justified as compensation for services. The most common application is
to sustain highway taxes that pay for road construction and maintenance. 279 "A more obvious application is to cases in which a state collects
a fee measured by services consumed rather than a tax. 28 0
The Supreme Court often defers to payment claims because excessive judicial intrusion could deter useful state undertakings. Its policy is
expressed in Justice Clarke's aphorism that interstate commerce "must
pay its way. '28 1 However, less deference is shown to the extent that a
state tax falls on commerce in transit rather than on import-export and

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1982)) (restricting state taxation of net income of multistate business); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2121(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1914 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 391 (1982)) (restricting discriminatory state taxation of generation or transmission
of electricity); Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 11503-11503a (West Supp. 1988)) (restricting state taxation of
rail transportation property); Act of June 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 7(a), 87 Stat. 88, 90
(codified as amended 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513 (1982)) (restricting state taxation of interstate air
travel). Regarding preemption of state taxes generally, see 1 J.Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein,
State Taxation S48-S51 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
276 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1
(1933); cf. 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 134-38 (stating that viability of traditional rule
barring taxation of goods in transit is uncertain as applied to fairly apportioned tax).
277 See P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce 122-30 (1953).
278 See text accompanying notes 189-98 supra and 385-93 infra. Thus, a taxpayer involved
in import-export commerce may not prevail on the claim that it pays for more than it receives.
See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Corp. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1981).
279 See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); cf. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (upholding service charge for maintenance and improvement of airport); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530
(1888) (upholding property tax on telegraph company).
280 See, e.g., Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423 (1880) (permitting city to impose
fees for use of its wharves); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding pilotage fee); text accompanying notes 377-93 infra (discussing charges for state services or property).
281 Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919); see also Powell,
State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 Yale L.J. 799, 799-800 (1922). This concept surfaced in Justice Miller's opinion in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 137
(1869).
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local commerce. Moreover, there are disagreements and some doctrinal
confusion within the Court. These points are illustrated by American
282
Trucking Associations v. Scheiner.
The Court overturned Pennsylvania's annual "flat" tax on trucks
using state highways. 2 83 Although there were ample nonhighway precedents supporting invalidation of what amounted to an unapportioned
property tax on instrumentalities of interstate transportation, 284 the
Court had sustained most highway levies as payment for road use. The
dissenters in the case rightly argued that the decision was against the
weight of precedent. 28 5 The traditional reasoning in this class of cases
required a state to justify failure to apportion its tax by its claim to payment for highway construction and maintenance. In other words, the
Court had balanced the burdens imposed on commerce in transit and
partially protectionist effects on import-export commerce against state
payment claims.

28 6

Rather than distinguish precedents on traditional grounds, the majority rested its decision on "discrimination" against interstate commerce. 287 Payment for highway use was relegated to an affirmative
defense to discrimination, and commerce in transit was not mentioned at
all. 28 8 This went beyond the traditional definition of discrimination to
embrace any multiple burden involving only partially discriminatory effects. Since the Court surely cannot intend to strike down all multiple
burdens (else we have no federal system), resting its decision on discrimination so defined converts that concept from a useful legal rule into a
post hoc conclusion.289
282 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987).
283 See id. at 2831.
284 See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873) (overturning
railroad freight tax); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855) (overturning
tax on out-of-state ships docking at state port).
285 See American Trucking, 107 S. Ct. at 2848 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2851 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
286 As Justice O'Connor noted, that balance might reasonably have been struck more
strongly against states in the first place, but sharply altering the balance here confronted stare
decisis more directly than the majority acknowledged. See id. at 2848-51 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
287 Id. at 2842-43.

288 See id. at 2838-47. The truckers argued another theory of discrimination as well. When
it enacted the tax at issue, Pennsylvania inartfully reduced its annual registration fee for local
trucks by the amount of the tax, so that the immediate burden fell only on trucks registered in
other states. Id. at 2835-36. This action reduced a charge previously imposed only on local
trucks. Although the Court did not expressly rely on this alternate theory, it may have influenced the outcome; Pennsylvania's action departed from established interstate accommodations on truck registration fees.
289 The Court's leading precedents had sustained "flat" state highway taxes. See Capitol
Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R.
Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947). The Aero Mayflower Court unanimously and expressly decided
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b. Regulation.
Transportation regulation generates a distinct
problem. In reviewing other kinds of regulation, the Court can abate the

costs of conflicting and multiple state rules by allocating jurisdiction to
the one state with the greatest interest in the subject.290 For regulation of

transportation passing through several states, unitary allocation is not
feasible. The states of origin and destination have the dominant interest
in goods carried, sufficient to prohibit their taxation en route. But all
affected states have a strong regulatory interest in instrumentalities of
transportation passing through their territory. No state's interest predominates. Some forms of regulation, such as speed limits, port rules,
and minimum crew laws, impose no extra costs on transportation passing
through compared with local commerce. But others, such as mudflap
size, truck size, and train length requirements, impose great costs when
neighbors regulate inconsistently.

The Court first recognized this problem in Justice Curtis's famous

dictum in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,2 91 asserting that states cannot
regulate subjects requiring national uniformity. 292 That rule, though
only occasionally enforced, was unduly rigid; it denied jurisdiction to all
states. 293 In many other instances, state safety laws were upheld as "local" in nature. 294 Since 1937, the Court has eased the uniformity rule to

allow conflicting regulations in more circumstances. In addition to laws
justified as safety measures, laws have been sustained based on political
restraint when costs fall substantially and evenhandedly on both local
and import-export commerce as well as on commerce in transit.29 5 Some
regulations are valid because states regulate compatibly with their neigh-

bors.296 Only the aberrant law of a state that is unable to show substan-

that the tax was not discriminatory. See 332 U.S. at 501, 503. Brice had a vigorous dissent
from Justice Frankfurter, but he would not have rested invalidity on finding discrimination.
See 339 U.S. at 548, 556-57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Prior to Brice, the Court had struck down several "flat" highway taxes, but each decision
was based on the judgment that the state had not fairly related the tax to payment for highway
use. None rested on finding discrimination. See id. at 561 app. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
American Trucking may have been consistent with these precedents on the ground that the
taxes at issue did not fairly relate to costs of highway use. See American Trucking, 107 S. Ct.
at 2836. But that does not seem to have been the basis for the Court's decision. See id. at
2836, 2843-47.
290 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
291 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
292 Id. at 319. Justice Story had used a similar implied uniformity argument in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), finding that the fugitive slave clause in article IV is
exclusive of state authority over the subject. Id. at 622-25.
293 See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 572 (1886); Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 204 (1885).
294 See, e.g., Peik v. Chicago & N. Ry., 94 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1877).
295 See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938).
296 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 665-72 (1981); Raymond
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tial safety justification is overturned.
For example, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp,297 the
Court struck down Iowa's truck length law. Iowa's differences from her
neighbors imposed heavy costs on commerce in transit through the state.
The law was not protectionist because burdened outsiders were not competitors of benefited locals. But costs imposed fell almost entirely on
commerce in transit because the state had enacted special exceptions for
import-export and local commerce. 298 The exceptions diminished already weak local political restraint. Thus, costs were almost entirely exported, and market adjustments would not overcome the state's actions.
The state's exceptions also belied its safety and road maintenance
2 99
justifications.
Some members of the Court confused the case by focusing on the
interests of neighboring states that might have received increased truck
traffic when trucks detoured around Iowa. 30 0 This was unimportant because if Iowa could deter trucks from passing through the state, so could
other states. The main problem was extra costs imposed on buyers and
sellers of goods passing through or forced to go around Iowa, which interfered with legitimate interests of the states of origin and destination.
In sum, state laws burdening transportation typically impose on
commerce in transit, import-export commerce, and local commerce in
different proportions according to circumstances. Judicial review applies
both the antiprotectionism norm governing import-export commerce and
the allocation and uniformity tests for commerce in transit, seeking to
confine a state to its fair share of taxes or payment for services and to
require that regulations relate to important local matters.
5. Interference in ExternalMarkets
Regulations that interfere in external markets must meet the Court's
allocation and antiprotectionism norms. State laws regulating corporate
takeovers, for example, restrain share sales occurring entirely outside the
regulating state. They prevent some takeovers altogether and raise costs
of others substantially. Impositions compound when more than one state
regulates the same target corporation. 30 1 The statutes are not categoriMotor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 432, 445 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359
U.S. 520, 523, 529-30 (1959). Rather than resting on abstract judgments about national and
local interests, these decisions depended on actual barriers to interstate mobility.
297 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
298 Id. at 671.
299 Id. at 678.

300 See id. at 675 n.18, 675-77. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion labeled the state's law
protectionist. See id. at 680, 685, 686 (Brennan, J., concurring). This seems incorrect. See
text accompanying notes 186-87 supra.
301 See Jarrell, State Anti-Takeover Laws and the Efficient Allocation of Corporate Control:

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

April 1988]

ECONOMIC UNION

cally discriminatory, but their purpose and effect can be protectionist in
some circumstances. When the target and its management are local, legislative motives might include protecting incumbent management and restraining firms from leaving the state.
The Court reached opposing results in reviewing Indiana's and Illinois's antitakeover statutes. It struck down the Illinois law in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,302 but it sustained Indiana's in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America.3 0 3 In each case, most of the target's shareholders, and
the raider attempting to buy their shares, were located outside the regulating state. 3°4 Each state attempted to use its status as incorporator of
the target corporation and home of a sizable minority of its shareholders
to regulate transactions between parties outside the state. 30 5 Ironically,
the Indiana law that was sustained had protectionist effects as applied,
30 6
while the invalidated Illinois application did not.

To justify different outcomes, the Court relied on two distinctions
between the statutes,307 both of which related to the allocation principle.

First, the Illinois statute had much broader application. It regulated corporations of other states, corporations doing little or no business in the
state, and corporations lacking local shareholders. 30 8 The heart of the

MITE decision was the Court's judgment that the regulated transactions
between buyers and sellers outside Illinois were not sufficiently Illinois's
An Economic Analysis of Edgar v. MITE Corp., 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 111 (1983); see also
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-59, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J.), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
302 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
303 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). Although the two decisions can be reconciled, as the CTS majority opinion did, see id. at 1651-52, the later decision raises some question about the continued validity of the earlier. MITE was decided by a five-justice majority that included Chief
Justice Burger. Justice Scalia delivered a concurring opinion in CTS that showed a very different view from that of the MITE majority. See id. at 1652 (Scalia, J., concurring). However,
MITE had only one dissent on the merits, that of Justice Rehnquist, see MITE, 457 U.S. at
664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens's dissenting vote in CTS showed at least
one other vote for the position of the MITE majority, see CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (White, J.,
dissenting).
304 See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting); MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-42.
305 See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642, 1651-52; MITE, 457 U.S. at 464.
306 In MITE, the target was incorporated in Illinois but had its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania. There was no indication that it did substantial business in Illinois or that incumbent management had any connection with Illinois. The Indiana statute sustained in CTS
was interpreted to require that the target be incorporat9d in Indiana and have either its principal place of business or at least substantial assets in thq state. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52.
CTS, the target in the case, met these requirements. Thus, the statute's effect, and a likely
purpose, was to protect local managers and workers and to deter businesses from leaving the
state. See 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
307 See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1650-1652.
308 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
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affair to justify so much interference.30 9 The case was but a step beyond
Hanson v. Denckla;3 10 Illinois just barely met the due process test of minimum contacts.
By contrast, Indiana's law was limited in scope to insure that Indiana would have the greatest interest of any state. It was confined to corporations that were chartered in the state, had a large number of local
shareholders, and were principally based or had major operations
there.3 11 If jurisdiction to regulate takeovers was allocated to one state,
Indiana was the proper choice. To strike down the Indiana statute
would effectively have been to hold that no state could regulate because
regulation confined to share sales occurring within any one state would
be ineffective.
The Court also relied upon the states' form of regulation in evaluating the statutes. 312 Indiana required a shareholder vote on whether
shares bought by an acquiring corporate raider should have any voting
rights, and the state justified its law based on the state's interest in governance of its own corporations and in protection of the interests of small
shareholders. 3 13 By contrast, Illinois empowered a state official to forbid
3 14
takeovers whenever the official viewed them as substantively unfair.
Thus, Indiana was acting more in the traditional role of regulating internal corporate governance, and its law was arguably less burdensome.
These cases presented competing visions of the dormant commerce
power doctrine. Some Justices have been willing to apply the doctrine to
promote allocational efficiency in interstate markets. 31 5 To them, both
statutes should have been invalid because both effectively stifled takeovers, suppressing allocational efficiency in the interstate market in corporate control. 31 6 But the Court's majority, consistent with most
precedents, was concerned with discriminatory, multiple, or conflicting
regulations. By confining regulatory power to a single state and requiring it to act without categorical discrimination, the majority enforced the
3 17
doctrine's traditional norms.
An important issue left open is what state, if any, has a sufficiently
dominant interest to regulate takeovers under facts such as MITE's,
where a corporation formed under the laws of one state does business
309 See id. at 641-46.
310 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
311 See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1641 (quoting Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-1-20-5, 23-1-42-4(a) (West
Supp. 1987)).
312 See id. at 1650-51.
313 Id. at 1651.
314 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-27.

315 See, e.g., CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
316 See, e.g., id.
317 See id. at 1640.
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elsewhere. MITE can be read in two ways on this issue. If MITE held
Illinois's law facially invalid because it would apply to some firms incorporated in other states or lacking local shareholders, then perhaps any
state law confined to its own corporations will be upheld. On the other
hand, if MITE held Illinois's law invalid as applied to the facts of MITE,
which involved a firm actually incorporated in Illinois and having a significant number of local shareholders, then the Indiana statute's application only to firms doing substantial local business is the only important
distinction. If the latter reading is correct, there may be no state able to
regulate on facts like MITE's. 3 18 The incorporating state's interest was
insufficient under MITE. Likewise, a state, other than the state of incorporation, where a corporation does the largest share of its business would
not have a sufficient interest in corporate governance to justify protectionist and external effects.
Perhaps the essential distinction between the Indiana and Illinois
laws was the form of regulation. The Indiana law sustained in CTS regulated the voting rights of its own corporation, and the Illinois law invalidated in MITE controlled the fairness of share purchases. If that is the
crucial distinction, and doing substantial local business is not essential,
MITE is simply a limit on state regulation of foreign corporations. In
that event, Delaware has the power to stifle takeovers of half the major
firms in the country.
Price fixing cases also involve direct interference in the business of
another state. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 319 the Court struck
down New York's attempt to impose a minimum price for milk
purchases from in-state and out-of-state dairy farmers. 320 Firms importing milk into New York were required to show that they had paid out-ofstate farmers the price set by New York. The scheme was protectionist
because it required that transportation costs be added to the minimum
price, mandating a price advantage for dairy farmers closest to markets.3 2 1 It also favored producers who were less efficient than the interstate market average. 322 The Court's opinion relied on the latter
318 The Court's opinions are polysemous on this question. MITE reads like a typical opinion holding a statute invalid as applied. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644 (expressly rejecting Illinois's attempt to justify its law as applied to the facts). Justice Powell, who wrote the majority
opinion in CTS, seemed to distinguish MITE on grounds that assumed it to be based on facial
invalidity. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52. Justice Powell's opinion is tantalizingly ambiguous, and the issue is not elucidated by Justice White's dissent in CTS. See id. at 1653 (White,
J., dissenting).
319 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
320 See id. at 519.
321 See id. at 520 n.1, 527-38. The Court noted this fact, but did not rely on it for its
decision. See Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 376 (1964).
322 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522, 527. This would be protectionist if New York farmers were
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factor. 323 The Court also stressed that New York was regulating transactions in Vermont. 324 Because Vermont clearly had the greater interest in
these transactions, New York's law was struck down as applied.

In Brown-FormanDistillersCorp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 325 the Court invalidated maximum price fixing. A New York law
mandated that wholesale liquor prices charged in New York by interstate
producers be no higher than the lowest price they charged anywhere in
the nation during the previous month. 326 The Court held this to be unwarranted protectionism to benefit New York liquor buyers. 327 Liquor
producers operating only in New York were not directly burdened by the
rule but had to conform substantially to it or be undersold. It is unlikely
that the law affected New York imports or exports of liquor at all. The
Court presumed that the law improperly burdened interstate commerce
by forcing up the price of liquor in other states, particularly smaller
ones.328 In other words, New York was exploiting market power as a
large consumer to gain advantage at the expense of smaller states. 329 The
330
dissent stressed the absence of proof that the law had these effects,

331
while the majority seemed willing to assume them.

E.
L

Market ParticipantImmunity

ProtectionistSubsidies

In addition to regulations or taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce, a state may favor local commerce with subsidies. Direct
cash subsidies to local producers, if derived from general tax revenues,
have almost the same economic effect on external competition as tariffs. 332 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the antiprotectiongenerally less efficient than their competitors in other states. See Brown, supra note 93, at 234.
323 See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523, 527.
324 See id. at 521.
325
326
327
328
329

476 U.S. 573 (1986).

Id. at 575-78.
Id. at 579-84.
See id. at 582-84.
See text accompanying notes 136-37, 170-71 supra; see also United States Brewers Ass'n
v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982) (overturning similar Connecticut beer-pricing law), aff'd
mem., 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
330 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 586-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331 See id. at 582-84.
332 See J. Ingram, International Economics 308-09 (1983); G. Meier, International Economics: The Theory of Policy 62 (1980). The principal difference between subsidies and tariffs is
who pays. Tariffs are mostly paid by consumers of the goods subject to the tariff. Subsidies
are derived from taxes or state property. An earmarked tax on locally subsidized goods paid
by the industry would presumably be struck down, since the tax and subsidy scheme together
would constitute a discriminatory tax. See Varat, supra note 246, at 541-45. An earmarked
tax paid only by producers who received the subsidy would be sustained; it would simply
redistribute from more to less efficient local producers. In the discussion that follows, I as-
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ism rule does not apply to at least some kinds of protectionist subsidies.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,333 the Court upheld Maryland's cash bounties to state-registered processors of abandoned automobile hulks. 3 34 Although the state's scheme categorically favored in-state
processors over external competitors, the Court held that protectionist
subsidies by states as "market participants" are immune from the dor335
mant commerce power doctrine.
Although the Court stated that the question presented in Alexandria
Scrap was "without precedent," 33 6 prior decisions indirectly supported
its holding by sustaining state regulation of natural resources 337 and of
markets in which the state was actively involved. 338 The Court has folsume that subsidies are paid from general state tax revenues. This means that the state's tax
rates, including taxes paid by subsidized producers, are adjusted to pay for the subsidy, offsetting part of its cost. I also use the term "subsidy" to mean a positive benefit paid out of state
funds or other property. Tax exemptions, although they are sometimes called "tax subsidies,"
are not immune from dormant commerce power scrutiny. See Westinghouse Corp. v. Tully,
466 U.S. 388 (1984).
333 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
334 Id. at 796-98.
335 Id. at 810. Several scholars have argued that the decision was wrong. See Blumoff, The
State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. Ill. U.L.J. 73, 108-12; Varat, supra note 246, at 501-08, 562-64; The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 70-78 (1983); Note, 18 B.C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 893, 921-28 (1977). Contra Regan, supra note 18, at 1196 n.203.
Although the Court's opinion did not specifically limit the scope of its announced rule to
protectionist subsidy cases, I believe the limitation to be implied by other precedents. See text
accompanying notes 363-69, 379-93 infra.
The Maryland law could have been sustained on narrower grounds because it did not
categorically discriminate against interstate commerce. Although the law explicitly favored
transactions within Maryland over exports and transactions wholly outside the state, it also
stimulated imports. Thus, it had partially discriminatory effects. See Alexandria Scrap, 426
U.S. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the scheme as a whole may not have burdened interstate commerce. Maryland may have created the market it skewed. See id. at 81416 (Stevens, J., concurring). Finally, Maryland had a legitimate interest in disadvantaging
outside processors because these businesses attracted many more hulks abandoned outside
Maryland. See id. at 812-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336 426 U.S. at 807.
337 See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 357 (1908) (water),
limited by Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954-58 (1982); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 604-06 (1896) (game), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
336-38 (1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1876) (planting oysters in stateowned river bed); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855) (oysters in state-owned
submerged lands). Sporhase and Hughes were based on the judgment that the states' ownership claims to water and wild game were fictional, and the commerce involved was actually
private. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951-54; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-56. Both opinions imply
that if the state had actually owned the resource, its preference for residents would have been
valid.
338 See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-85 (1868) (insurance, which was
heavily regulated); Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73, 81 (1850) (banking, in which
states often had substantial ownership). Paul's definition of commerce was repudiated in
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lowed Alexandria Scrap twice. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,3 39 it sustained
South Dakota's refusal to sell cement made by its state-owned plant to
nonresidents of the state. In White v. Massachusetts Councilof Construction Employers,34° it sustained Boston's requirement that city residents
comprise at least one-half of the workers on construction crews for public buildings. 34 1 In both cases, the states preferred locals when private
markets would not, which lowered the return on state sales or increased
the price of state purchases. These subsidies involved competitive markets not dominated by the state, and they affected the state's importexport commerce rather than commerce in transit or external markets.

The Reeves Court offered four reasons for market participant immunity: support in case law for the distinction between states as "market
participants" and as "market regulators, ' 342 state sovereignty, difficulties
in analyzing state actions in the market, and equitable treatment of public and private market participants. The Court's first argument, that
precedents "comport" with the rule, 343 was somewhat circular. It did
not address the propriety of distinguishing clear precedents against state
protectionism when states are involved in the market.
The Court's second ground was state sovereignty. 344 This is logically sound if one accepts the Court's distinction between state activities
and state regulation of private persons that was the basis for National

League of Cities v. Usery345 and for the Court's decisions on state immu-

United States v. South-E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-53 (1944).
Florida's prohibition on sales of unripe citrus fruit was sustained against a dormant commerce power attack in Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915). According to the opinion, the
state's purpose may have been to enhance the market reputation of local fruit. See id. at 61.
However, rather than according Florida market participant immunity and upholding the law
as an active subsidy, the Court concluded that the ban was valid as a public health measure.
Id. at 61-62.
The same policy reasons that justify market participant immunity may underlie the
Court's earlier precedents sustaining compensating use taxes and other taxes designed to neutralize advantages for interstate commerce created by a state's domestic taxes. Subsidies impose costs on voters, so that local political restraint is strong. See notes 206-10 and
accompanying text supra.
339 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
340 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
341 The Court rejected a market participant immunity defense in South-Cent. Timber Dev.,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93-99 (1984). It also rejected this claim in two privileges and
immunities cases. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
342 447 U.S. at 436.
343 Id. at 437.
344 See id. at 438.

345 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 531 (1985). The Court's retreat from National League of Cities seems to weaken this
argument.
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nity from federal taxes. 346 In the dormant commerce power context, deference to state sovereignty may be as much a pragmatic policy as a
normative one. In Reeves, South Dakota's cement production and distribution scheme was a complex, affirmative undertaking that required active state involvement in the market. The Court stressed that states
might be unduly discouraged from useful activities if the commerce
3 47
clause limit were enforced against them.

The third justification was that when states act in a proprietary capacity, cases are "difficult to assess under traditional commerce clause
analysis. '3 48 One reason is the lack of announced rules when a state
trades rather than governs. State trading that consistently favors local
suppliers or customers may be protectionist, or local parochial preferences may be justified by market conditions. Lacking an explicit statute,
rule, or contract, reviewing courts would have difficulty determining
when local firms have no market advantage justifying the state's
preference.
In addition, active subsidies are difficult to assess because they are
pervasive. State or local public works subsidize all firms that enjoy public benefits worth more than the taxes they pay. Many public works decisions have parochial motivation. Highways and public buildings are
located to favor in-state interests, grants are made to chambers of com-

merce, and tourism offices advertise local businesses. Quality inspection

programs enhance local products at state expense.3 49 These actions are
346 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). The distinction is questioned
in Varat, supra note 246, at 494-99. There are analogs in other constitutional doctrines. States
as buyers were immune from the due process strictures of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903), the Fuller Court upheld a state law setting an
eight-hour limit on the working day of employees of the state or any of its subdivisions and of
employees of public works contractors. Also, bona fide state residence as a condition for distribution of state benefits is impervious to attack under the equal protection clause. See Martinez
v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983) (involving free public education); cf. Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (distinguishing regulation of private markets from "the regulation or
distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people of the
State" and regulation of "persons who are engaged on public work or receive the benefit of
public moneys").
Other intergovernmental immunity cases are based on the same policy: the constitutional
scheme requires state governments to have basic freedom from federal control in conducting
state operations. The Court has read partial state immunity into the antitrust laws. See Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). And it construes the word "person" in federal statutes
not to include states unless contrary intent is clear. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442
U.S. 653, 667 (1979).
347 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39, 441, 446. This notion appears occasionally in earlier
opinions. See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852) (stating that such
enforcement would "effectively prevent or paralyze every effort at internal improvement by the
several states").
348 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439.
349 See, e.g., Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915).
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protectionist; they give local firms competitive advantages over outsiders.
To police them under the dormant commerce power would be more intrusive than review of regulations and taxes, and line drawing would be
quite difficult. The Court would have to evaluate the degree of subsidy in
every public service that favors residents.
Subsidies are also difficult to assess as burdens on commerce. When
a state is one of many buyers or sellers in a reasonably competitive private market, the state's parochial actions may impose a negligible burden
on the market. In paying subsidies, the state does not directly impose on
any outsider; rather, it aids local competitors. 350 In some instances, subsidies stimulate commerce that would otherwise not exist. It is hard to
see why out-of-state traders should have a federal right to share in commerce created by the state.351 Sometimes subsidies distort an existing
private market in favor of local enterprise; their effect is then similar to
that of invalid regulations and taxes. It would, however, be difficult to
separate subsidies that burden preexisting trade from those that stimulate
35 2
new trade.
The Reeves Court's fourth ground for decision-a concern for
"evenhandedness" in the marketplace 353 -was less substantial. The
Court argued that states as market participants should have the same
freedom, and be subject to the same market restraints, as private market
actors. 354 This reasoning begs the question because a state's unique response to parochial politics is the basis for the dormant commerce power
limitation itself. Invocation of the concept of "evenhandedness" without
accounting for the unique position of states as political bodies is circular.
Market restraints may satisfactorily limit the damage states as spenders
can do, but it is hard to see what that has to do with "evenhandedness."
The Court's third and fourth grounds hint at a somewhat different
basis to justify the exception for states as market participants. Subsidies
do not distort local politics nearly as effectively as do protectionist regulations and taxes or transportation regulations. Subsidy costs are directly
borne internally. The immediate expense is borne by the state treasury
or other state property.
In all cases, political restraint works more reliably when states
spend their citizens' tax money on subsidies than when they merely allo350 The issue is more difficult when a subsidy has the form of reducing or forgoing, for local
firms only, a charge or condition imposed on outsiders. See note 378 and accompanying text
infra.
351 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815-17 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
352 See id. at 809 n.18.
353 447 U.S. at 439.
354 See id.
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cate advantages among classes of private persons through regulation.
While the general consumer interest is a weak restraint on regulation that
raises prices, 355 the general taxpayer interest is stronger. Voting taxpayers may not pay precise attention to every item of state expenditure, but
they do pay attention to the overall burden. This in turn disciplines legislatures to be more cautious when they spend than when they regulate.
Interstate competition for people and capital makes this restraint more
3 56
effective at the state than at the national level.
The Reeves Court also suggested that since a state's property belongs to its people, local favoritism is appropriate. 357 Yet, the state treasury and state property are, for the most part, simply accumulations of
state taxes, collected from out-of-state merchants as well as locals. Even
so, reservation of resources for state citizens exports costs to a lesser degree than laws that selectively impose on outsiders. The treasury and
other property of a state are sufficiently related to the tax burden on its
own citizens to restrain subsidies by normal political discipline.
These reasons persuasively support the Court's implicit conclusion
that policing subsidies is less important to national market interests and
more intrusive upon state autonomy than judicial review of taxes and
regulations. They do not, however, dictate judicial abstention. For example, under the Treaty of Rome, policing subsidies is an important
function of the European Court of Justice. But the Treaty has standards,
albeit vague ones, about the kinds of subsidies that are invalid.3 5 8 Moreover, political traditions in the United States are much charier of direct
subsidies than European traditions.
Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White involved procurement and active subsidies rather than direct, passive subsidies. Alexandria Scrap and
White concerned governmental procurement; in each case the state's primary aim was to purchase goods or services, and in doing so it favored
local suppliers. Although Reeves was closer to a pure subsidy for residents, the state was engaged in a complex, affirmative undertaking and
was actively participating in the market.
Passive subsidies may not enjoy the same immunity from dormant
commerce power scrutiny that procurement and active subsidies have
355 See M. Kreinin, supra note 171, at 301-02 (comparing political restraint on tariffs with
that on subsidies).
356 See Tiebout, supra note 161, at 416, 422 n.18.
357 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39 n. 11; see also Varat, supra note 246, at 504-08 (discussing
this issue extensively).
358 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 9294, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 51-52; Schwartz, supra note 162, at 394, 396-415; cf. Protocol Modifying
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Sept. 14, 1948, art. III, §§ 4, 8, 62 Stat.
3679, 3681, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at 4-5, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82-84 (1948) (excepting government
procurement purchases from general anti-embargo provision).
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received. The Reeves Court suggested that a statute reserving state3 59
owned natural resources to residents might require a different result.
That would constitute a transfer subsidy-a largely passive interference
in private markets. The Court has left open the possibility that passive
cash or property subsidies, those not involving affirmative state undertak36°
ings, will be subject to the antiprotectionism norm of the doctrine.
Moreover, two of the Court's bases for distinguishing procurement and
active subsidies from other objects of the dormant commerce power doctrine do not apply to passive subsidies. The deterrent effect of commerce
clause scrutiny on worthwhile state projects would not justify judicial
deference to passive subsidies. Likewise, the problem of assessing state
commercial activity that may be based on legitimate proprietary interests
3 61
and market conditions would not extend to passive subsidies.
Although distinguishing passive subsidies from affirmative subsidies or
procurement cases may require some difficult line drawing, it is analytically feasible.
Should the subsidy immunity extend to passive, direct subsidies that
underwrite local producers? The crucial factor should be the effectiveness of local politics and of competition between states to restrain excessive resort to passive subsidies. The past record strongly suggests that
they are effective. The prevalence of passive subsidies in other nations
provides some basis for caution. 362 But even when political discipline
and interstate competition fail, Congress can intervene to restrain excessive subsidies. On balance, the better rule is immunity for all subsidies.
The rule is simple to apply-it eliminates the problems of distinguishing
between passive and active subsidies-and judicial intervention is
unnecessary.
Another unsettled issue is that of "downstream" restrictions, when
states impose on trading partners protectionist conditions that restrict
359 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443-44. But see note 337 and accompanying text supra. The
Reeves Court's distinction might have been based upon market power over scarce resources
rather than upon the general question of subsidy. But the Court's emphasis on the state's
complex undertaking suggests that it intended the latter reason. See 447 U.S. at 444. Professor Varat argues that the Reeves dictum precludes favoritism for citizens in allocating scarce
state-owned resources. See Varat, supra note 246, at 554-60; cf. Hellerstein, Hughes v.
Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979
Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 76-79 (arguing that state power to distribute state-owned resources does not
extend to conditions on disposition that "independently burden" interstate commerce).
36o Reeves was decided by a 5-4 vote, and the Court has consistently described the immunity
to be for "market participants," rather than for subsidies. See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436,
440. Thus, the Court could readily distinguish a new case involving passive subsidies.
361 See notes 344-52 supra.
362 See R. Johns, International Trade Theories and the Evolving International Economy 37

(1985).
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363
resale or other private trading outside the state. Dicta in the White
and Reeves 364 opinions said that such restrictions would be a different
case. The Court later struck down an Alaska law that required buyers of
state timber to process it in the state before export.3 65 The plurality distinguished this restriction on the disposition of goods purchased from the
state from market participant subsidies.3 66 It reasoned that a state has
greater interest in transactions in which it is directly involved than in
subsequent disposition of the goods it sold. 367 Also, downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory impact than subsidies because they govern
private transactions remote from the state's immediate commercial
3 68
involvement.
The dissent countered that the state merely paid "the buyer of the
timber indirectly, by means of a reduced price, to hire Alaska residents to
process the timber. '3 69 Thus, according to the dissent, the law served as
a subsidy to local timber processors.
The distinction between downstream restrictions and direct subsidies is sound. Downstream restrictions require disclosure of parochial
standards and enforcement against recalcitrants; they resemble regulations in form. They are not important to maintain a state's freedom to
undertake useful public works. While direct subsidies tend to affect
mainly the transactions they create, downstream restrictions interfere
with independent, private market transactions and will often reach transactions that would otherwise occur entirely outside the state. Since costs
are more likely to be exported or concealed in indeterminate prices,
political restraints on downstream restrictions are more attenuated than
those on direct subsidies.
The dissent's rule exempting all conditions attached to subsidies, including downstream restrictions, would be workable. Interstate competition would deter states from demanding too much. However, the
plurality's rule is a better line between the competing policies of a national common market and state freedom of action.

RestrictingImports of Subsidized Goods

2.

The exclusion of state-subsidized goods also raises commerce clause
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983).
364 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 n.7 (1980).
365 See South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (plurality opinion);
cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528-31 (1978) (similar holding under privileges and immunities clause).
366 See South-Cent Timber, 467 U.S. at 98 (plurality opinion).
363

367 See id.

368 Id. at 99.
369 Id. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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issues. Nations sometimes restrict imports of goods because of government subsidies to exporting producers. 370 States have prohibited imports
of goods subsidized by other states in one situation-goods produced in
other states' prisons. 3 71 These laws were initially attacked under the dormant commerce power. Before the Court could settle the question, Congress expressly authorized such state laws, 37 2 and the Court sustained
37 3
them.
When states exclude subsidized foreign goods, serious issues of interference in national trade policy arise. 374 Exclusion of state-subsidized
domestic goods might be sustained in extreme cases such as those involving prison-made goods. 375 However, allowing exclusion generally would
create a sweeping exception to the Court's antiprotectionism rule, because all states aid their own in countless ways. On the other hand, unless preempted by federal statute or treaty, states themselves can decline
3 76
to purchase subsidized goods under the market participant exception.
3.

Charges

When states impose charges or conditions for state services or for
use of state property, their actions are often literally those of market participants. These actions, unlike subsidies to local industry, directly burden outsiders, rather than indirectly causing them competitive harm. As
noted previously, states are entitled to fair payment for services provided
or for use of state property, and they may reasonably condition use of
state property.3 77 A state participating in the market may charge less to
370 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, art. XVI (Subsidies), 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A51-52; T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 47-48, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 250; Protocol
Modifying General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, art. VI (Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties), 62 Stat. 3679, 3682-83, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at 5-7, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 8690; G. Meier, supra note 332, at 110-12.
371 See People v. Hawkins, 157 N.Y. 1, 51 N.E. 257 (1898); Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio St.
418, 47 N.E. 50 (1897).
372 See Act of July 24, 1935, ch. 412, 49 Stat. 494 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 17611762 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986)).
373 See Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
374 Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 800 (1969) (state Buy American Act invalid interference with federal powers over foreign commerce and foreign affairs) and Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208
Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962) (same Act invalid under GATT) and Territory v.
Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957) (territory foreign labeling act invalid under GATT) with KSB Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'r, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977)
(sustaining state Buy American Act based on explicit exception in GATT for government
procurement purchases), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
375 This would be so particularly if the statute banned all prison-made goods, including
those from the enacting state. See Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
376 See text accompanying notes 332-35 supra.
377 See text accompanying notes 277-80 supra.
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local commerce than to its external competitors as a form of protectionist
378
subsidy.
When charges or conditions exceed the state's expenditures, state
justification is weaker. The Court's allocation and uniformity rules limit
charges or conditions that can be imposed on commerce in transit or
external commerce, even when nondiscriminatory. 379 This limitation is
illustrated by the fact that state ownership of highways has not immunized highway taxes and regulations from the dormant commerce
power. 380 Where a state burdens commerce in transit by charging
merchants for the use of state-owned property with geographic advantages, costs are exported just as effectively as when state taxes or regulations exploit geography to impose on commerce in transit. Local
political restraint on charges is then just as weak as in regulation or tax
cases. Charges are subject to none of the discipline that subsidies
evoke. 381 Dormant commerce power limits apply.
Charges or conditions for services or the use of state property in
import-export commerce are another matter. As previously noted, a
state's regulation of its import-export commerce is generally supported
by stronger state interests and is more effectively restrained by market
and political forces. Restrictions on import-export commerce are invalid
382
only when categorically protectionist or discriminatory.

In some nineteenth-century cases, the Court sustained nondiscriminatory wharfage charges for use of public landings.3 8 3 These decisions

contrast with stricter judicial limits in telegraph and highway cases, in
which commerce in transit was more heavily involved.38 4
The Court confronted an interesting mix of these issues in Western
378 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 801 (1976).
379 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 715-17 (1972).
380 See text accompanying notes 279-89 supra. Similar rules governed disputes about state
and local "pole taxes" levied on telegraph companies. See City of St. Louis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893).
381 See text accompanying notes 355-56 supra.
382 See text accompanying notes 182-203 supra.
383 Compare Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887) (sustaining allegedly excessive wharfage charges for use of public landing) and Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107
U.S. 691 (1883) (sustaining allegedly extortionate wharfage charges for use of public landing)
with Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U.S. 676 (1927) (striking down, under commerce
clause, city's attempt to give monopoly landing right to one ferry company) and Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) (striking down, under commerce clause, public wharfage charges
that discriminated between in-state and out-of-state goods) and Cannon v. New Orleans, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 577 (1874) (striking down, under duty-of-tonnage clause, "levee dues" on any
ship that moored or landed at the port whether or not at a public landing).
384 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987); Telegraph Co.
v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882).
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Oil & Gas Association v. Cory.3 85 Petroleum companies challenged California's ad valorem charge imposed on imported and exported petroleum
products passing through pipelines across state-owned tidal and submerged lands between tankers and refineries. The state defended the
386
charge on the ground of market participant immunity.
The court of appeals struck down the charge as an ad valorem tariff
on goods in transit. 38 7 The court's reasoning was doubtful because the
goods were not being shipped through California. Rather, they were imports and exports of refineries in the state.
The charge in Western Oil did not facially discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce. But because of the location of state tidal and
submerged lands, the charge operated virtually as a tariff. Dealers in
imported and exported products paid the charge, but local competitors
did not. Its effectiveness was bolstered by its relation to the state's wharfage charges at public tanker landings. 388 The effectiveness of the charge
also depended on the existence of alternative ways to ship, such as private tanker landings or private submerged or tide lands, and on competition between California and other states. Since the charge operated as a
tariff, it was categorically protectionist.
Market participant immunity allows some forms of state protectionism, but California's reliance on the immunity defense was doubtful. The
state had a monopoly on shoreline sites used by oil companies.3 89 Moreover, the tax could not be justifed as compensation for state facilities or
services. The land that was subject to the charge was unimproved, and
the state did not provide it with any services.39 0 The charge did not sup.
port any affirmative investment in infrastructure that might be discouraged by judicial intervention.
Although import-export commerce was involved, this was a rare
case in which durable cost exporting to other states was probable. Moreover, the federal interest in foreign commerce was involved, and the
Court has traditionally deferred less to states in foreign commerce cases
than in cases involving interstate commerce. 391 Even the public wharfage decisions that sustained charges for the use of public landings did not
allow explicit discrimination, 392 so that precedent did not support un385 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 471 U.S. 146 (1985).
386 Id. at 1342.
387 Id. at 1345-46.
388 See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. California State Lands Comm'n, 105 Cal. App. 3d 554,
558-59, 164 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (1980) (decision on state law issues respecting same charges).
389 Cory, 726 F.2d at 1343.
390 Id. at 1344.

391 See South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984); Japan Line v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-51 (1979).
392 See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880). Chief Justice Waite dissented on grounds
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qualified market participant immunity for charges.
Nevertheless, the case was a close one. Competition between California and other states and private owners may have been sufficient restraint. If the petroleum companies built expensive facilities without first
bargaining to limit charges of this kind, they were improvident. 393 We
can assume that they would not do so again.
F.

Summary
This Part's review of the dormant commerce power doctrine can be
briefly summarized. The doctrine's essential purpose is to promote interstate commercial harmony by restraining state interference in the affairs
of other states. Interference arises from two basic causes, state protection of local commerce against external competition, and extra costs that
result when more than one sovereign regulates or taxes the same person
or transaction. The latter costs are of two kinds-multiple burdens, and
conflict costs caused by inconsistent regulations.
The competing constitutional value is state autonomy. States have
distinctly greater legitimate interest in regulating and taxing their import
and export commerce than they have in imposing on commerce in transit
through their territory or on transactions occurring outside their borders.
Accordingly, judicial review is more deferential when states regulate
their import-export commerce. State statutes are upheld unless categorically protectionist, that is, unless they categorically favor a commercial
group within the state over its external competitors. Even categorical
protectionism is sustained when states are market participants or states
justify protectionism for quarantines. Other parochial regulation of import-export markets is left to market and political restraint, which is
effective.
State impositions on commerce in transit and on external transactions are struck down not only on the basis of protectionism but also for
excessive multiple or conflict burdens. The Court reduces multiple and
conflict burdens by allocating jurisdiction to a single state, by requiring
apportionment of certain state taxes, and by requiring substantial justification of costly conflict burdens on interstate transportation.
that sound like market participant immunity, but no other Justice joined him. See id. at 444
(Waite, C.J., dissenting); see also Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U.S. 676 (1927) (invalidating town license requirements for passenger ferries operated on boundary waters between
states).
393 See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 567 n.4, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.4.
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III
PERSONAL RIGHTS THEORIES

Two concepts derived from the constitutional law of individual
rights have been misapplied to the dormant commerce power doctrine.
One advocates guarding personal rights of nonresident merchants under
the political process theory of judicial review. 394 The other applies the
special legislative motivation standard of modem suspect classification
395
law under the equal protection clause.

In a sense these theories are a second coming. In the period of economic due process, from 1890 to 1937, the dormant commerce power
doctrine became entangled with asserted personal rights to economic
freedom under the fourteenth amendment. Litigants often made alternative claims under both theories, and the Court occasionally said that
there is a "right" to engage in interstate commerce. 396 Since 1937, the
Court has largely disentangled the two doctrines.
The distortions the new theories create are not obvious because most
of them produce results that do not differ from the Court's in the great
majority of cases. The distortions are troublesome nonetheless. Personal
rights theorists claim that their creations would be more deferential to
state autonomy than is the Court's doctrine. The contrary is more likely
correct. Like other brands of modem judicial activism centering on individual rights, personal rights theories would probably broaden judicial
intrusion under the dormant commerce power. That would be acceptable if these theories produced compensating gains in efficiency, certainty
of result, or other useful ends. But they would not; results would become
less certain and the doctrine less efficient if the doctrine lost its anchor to
the original purposes of economic union and interstate harmony.
A.

PoliticalProcess Theory as ConstitutionalJustification

Advocates of personal rights theories for the dormant commerce
power reject the Court's existing approach as unjustified in text or history, or as outdated. In particular, Professor Julian Eule argues that the
is the
best constitutional justification for policing interstate commerce
397
political process theory of Justice Stone and Dean Ely.
Ely has eloquently expanded on Stone to defend much of the mod394 See note 18 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 397-416 infra.
395 See note 19 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 430-71 infra. This
theory does not explicitly advocate personal rights for anyone. But the legislative motivation
concept it applies is used to secure personal equality, so the concept implicitly brings to disadvantaged classes of persons the rights-based norm of legislative intent.
396 See, e.g., Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891).
397 See Eule, supra note 18, at 437-46.
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ern Court's activism as justified to cure defects in democratic political
processes. 398 Accordingly, Eule argues that state laws burdening interstate commerce or disadvantaging nonresidents should be invalidated
only to reinforce political accountability. And this occurs only when
courts void state laws that predominantly disadvantage nonresidents of
the state-those unable to vote in its elections.
Ely's theory has been powerfully criticized.3 99 The most important
argument against his theory is that it assumes that majoritarian democracy is the predominant constitutional value in every situation. When
individual rights against state or federal government are at issue, this
assumption begs the question. The same is true when the issue relates to
constitutional structure, and the traditional structure is less than perfectly democratic.
The dormant commerce power raises the latter problem. The constitutional issue posed by the doctrine cannot be made into one of
majoritarian democracy without disregarding the federal system altogether. The issue is a federal system choice between states and the nation, "determining the locus of power in a federal union." 4°° If states are
the proper political units to exercise power over interstate commerce absent a governing act of Congress, it is entirely appropriate for their voters
to make laws to their own advantage at the expense of other states and
their residents. This is an inherent sovereign power. If the nation is the
proper unit, the interests of states and their residents who are burdened
by laws of other states may be a relevant concern. Since the essential
question is to which level of government the Constitution delegates this
power, Ely's theory is no help.401
Moreover, if the Court decides on some other ground (such as an
implicit commerce clause purpose to further economic union and interstate commercial harmony) that the proper political unit is the nation
rather than the states, the problem of political accountability for the dormant commerce power disappears because Congress has full discretion to
398 See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 102-04 (1980).
See, e.g., Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037 (1980).
400 Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
1117, 1140 (1978).
401 1 doubt that Ely would agree with Eule's application of his theory. Ely mentions the
concept of virtual representation in connection with the dormant commerce power doctrine,
but he seems to be referring to the doctrine's application rather than to its constitutional basis.
See J. Ely, supra note 398, at 83-84. For Eule's application, see text accompanying notes 40511 infra.
399
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amend any decision of the Court.4 02 The same would be true if the Court
had followed Justice Daniel's view and rejected the doctrine; Congress
could create it by statute. Process theory says that judicial activism on
behalf of unrepresented nonresidents is justified, but one can return to
the constitutional text and respond that Congress's power is a sufficient
and sufficiently accountable protection for that interest.
Process theory presents another insuperable difficulty. The dormant
commerce power doctrine applies to foreign as well as interstate commerce. 4°3 When one tries to recast the doctrine from promotion of economic union into personal rights of nonresident traders, the foreign
commerce branch becomes politically absurd. It is inconceivable that the
framers intended to confer personal rights on foreign merchants or
consumers.
B.

PoliticalProcess Theories and JudicialRules

Even if political process theory does not justify the constitutional
decision to police interstate commerce, it might be employed as the best
sorting mechanism for the interstate branch of the dormant commerce
power doctrine. This hypothesis assumes the constitutional decision in
favor of judicial protection of interstate commerce. It addresses the issue
of the best way to achieve that goal. Personal rights advocates derive no
presumptive superiority from process-based constitutional theories.
They must show that they offer a better way to further interstate commercial harmony and a national common market.
As explained in Part II, the Court's existing doctrine prohibits protectionism, allocates jurisdiction to minimize multiple and conflict burdens on interstate commerce, and limits conflicting regulations of
interstate transportation. The allocation branch tries to limit jurisdiction
to the state with the greatest interest in the subject, usually the state in
which the largest share of regulatory costs fall, or to apportion jurisdiction among interested states. This inquiry often coincides with attempts
to prohibit excessive burdening of outsiders. And some concept of discrimination is common to both process theories and the Court's antiprotectionism norm. Moreover, some rules of the Court's allocation
doctrine are based alternatively on the commerce clause and on the due
process clause. 40 4 Hence, the results of applying a personal rights theory
402 See, e.g., O'Fallon, supra note 18, at 408.
403 See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
40 See notes 255, 264 and accompanying text supra. The Court occasionally applies the
equal protection clause to limit personal discrimination against foreign corporations. See, e.g.,
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 875 (1985); WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of
Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 119 (1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-72
(1949).
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may not differ dramatically from existing doctrine, at least for interstate
commerce.
Professor Eule's analysis of his proposed theory confirms this estimate. He quibbles with the Court's decisions protecting interstate transportation from conflicting state laws, but in the end approves of them. 4° 5
His principal criticism is saved for import-export cases that involve only
the antiprotectionism norm. He says that many of these cases, such
as H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond 4° 6 and City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey,4° 7 were wrongly decided against states because the costs of regulation were not exported, but rather fell mostly within the state.4° 8 Other
decisions sustaining state laws, such as Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MaryCo.,4 10 were equally
land 4° 9 and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
4 11
outsiders.
wrong because costs were imposed on
This analysis is incorrect. As noted in Part II, most import-export
regulations do not reliably impose costs on outsiders, except where a
state enjoys significant market power.41 2 Usually the losers are consumers in the enacting state.4 13 If proof of net cost exporting are required, as
Eule advocates, most protectionism cases should be decided for the state.
The antiprotectionism rule serves important policy aims that would
be impaired if Eule's analysis were adopted. The rule prevents overt hostility to other states and retaliation by competitors, the oppression of
weaker states by stronger, and the damage to allocational efficiency
caused by the political dominance of protection-seeking special interests.
A further practical reason is the simplicity and certainty of the antiprotectionism rule. Eule's alternative, requiring proof of the incidence of
taxes and regulatory costs, is impossibly complex. His judgments about
the incidence of government-imposed costs in Hood, Clover Leaf Creamery, and Exxon are unproved and would be very difficult to prove
4 14
satisfactorily.
Personal solicitude for nonresident merchants like Exxon leads to
difficult problems. Severe restrictions on commodities a state deems bad,
such as tobacco or plastic containers, often burden outside merchants.
Many laws will fall unless the Court gets into the substantive business of
405 See Eule, supra note 18, at 463-64, 467-68, 475. Eule omits tax laws from his discussion.
Id. at 426 n.2.
4M 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
407 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
408 Eule, supra note 18, at 463, 476-82.
409 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
410 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
411 Eule, supra note 18, at 444-46, 463, 466.
412 See text accompanying notes 168-73, 179-81 supra.
413 See text accompanying notes 166-67, 202-04 supra.
414 See Hellerstein, supra note 18, at 74-77; text accompanying notes 162-78 supra.
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second-guessing state judgments about the worthiness of various commodities or methods of selling. Common market theory has no problem
sustaining such regulations and avoids these difficulties by defining protectionism as legislation that burdens only direct competitors. 4 15
Moreover, if merchants have personal rights under the commerce
clause, they have a strong case for retroactive judicial remedies, remedies
that can be highly disruptive of state and local government. If the doctrine's prinicipal beneficiaries are other states and federal foreign trade
policy, for whom merchant litigants are merely private enforcers, reme4 16
dies can more readily be prospective only.

In sum, process theory supplies no justification for the basic constitutional decision in favor of judicial policing of interstate commerce. Its
application to foreign commerce is absurd. Finally, as a sorting device, it
is inferior to the Court's common market theory, which focuses on state
interference in the legitimate affairs of other states.
C. PersonalRights Theories and Laissez Faire
Critics of the dormant commerce power doctrine occasionally argue
that the doctrine balances state autonomy against the substantive value
of laissez faire, and that there is no support for that substantive value in
the records of 1787.417 The latter proposition has force, but not the former. As explained in Part II, the doctrine does not in any meaningful
415 See text accompanying notes 189-91, 225, 227-30 supra.
416 The Supreme Court has not decided whether businesses that win dormant commerce
power cases have a federal right to a retroactive remedy. By "retroactive remedy" I mean a
remedy for taxes or other actions occurring before suit is filed or taxes that are paid under
protest. These remedies severely disrupt state and local government, and there should be no
federal right to them.
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1984), the state raised the retroactivity issue indirectly by arguing that plaintiff companies had passed the invalid tax at issue
on to their customers, so the companies should not get a refund. The Court declined to address the issue and remanded it to the state courts. See id. at 277. The same thing occurred in
Tyler Pipe Indus., v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2822-23 (1987), and in
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2847-48 (1987). State immunity may
also limit retroactive remedies. See American Trucking Ass'n v. Gray, 108 S. Ct. 2, 4 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1987).
The issue is complicated by the structure of tax litigation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982), those challenging state taxes must ordinarily do so in state courts. State laws usually
require that disputed taxes be paid under protest and actions filed for refunds; injunctions are
not allowed. Such state laws require refunds of the taxes paid under protest and those paid
during the pendency of the refund action, so in many cases no federal remedy issue arises. If a
federal issue were raised about such refunds, there should be a right to them; from the protest
and filing, the state is on notice of the dispute and can plan accordingly. This would be analogous to prospective equitable relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 16066 (1908).
417 See notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra.
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sense impose laissez faire as a substantive value. 418 The state with the
greatest interest in a subject may tax or regulate severely, even ban all
private commerce in a commodity, subject only to the rule against protectionism. 4 19 When the doctrine confines jurisdiction to one state and
that state elects not to tax or regulate, the effect favors laissez faire; but
that is a substantive choice of the interested state, not of the Supreme
420
Court. The doctrine to some extent fosters competition among states,
which may also result in a reduction of state regulation or taxation.
Again, substantive choices are made by state governments, not by the
Court.
Personal rights theories, although typically offered as less intrusive
alternatives to the Court's doctrine, are likely to lead to greater judicial
protection of laissez faire. The established rule that Congress may abolish or alter the dormant commerce power doctrine is based on the assumption that the issue is one of federalism and that Congress is the
appropriate body to adjust the federal balance of power.42 1 Congress has
much less authority to alter personal rights.422 This suggests that adoption of a personal rights theory might lure the Court into reviewing federal statutes to determine their compatibility with free trade. Although a
number of scholars have supported this idea, none has analyzed it in
42 3
detail.
Expansion of judicial review to police federal commercial legislation
would be unjustified and unwise. It would be unjustified because the
commerce clause by its terms is an unqualified grant of power to Congress. Before 1937, the Court attempted to police federal legislation to
424
protect state sovereignty; it has since largely abandoned the attempt.
Regardless of the correct view of that issue, there is no basis in constitutional history for the Court to limit congressional exercises of the com418 See notes 135-37 and accompanying text supra.

419 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1981) (sustaining 30% coal severance tax); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1932) (sustaining state ban on billboard advertisements for tobacco products).
420 See text accompanying notes 161-63 supra.
421 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880-82 (1985); Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1985).
422 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); id. at 644 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 647-49, 654-55 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
423 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 18, at 147-50; Varat, supra note 246, at 569-71.
The Supreme Court of Australia exercises a version of this power; its decisions provide a
body of experience with such a standard. See V. MacKinnon, Comparative Federalism 46-80
(1964); Eule, supra note 18, at 429-34; Note, The Commerce Power Under the Australian
Constitution, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 660, 673-81 (1942).
424 See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7, § 4.9, at 151-56.
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merce power to consent to state laws. 42 5 Constitutional history supports
the dormant commerce power doctrine as a promotion of interstate harmony, not of economic efficiency.
Extending judicial review in aid of a national common market to
federal, as well as state, legislation might go further and revive substantive due process limits on economic legislation. Respecting dormant

commerce power issues, national legislation can impair a common market more than the Court otherwise allows only by authorizing the states
to do what the Court would otherwise forbid. Congress cannot disadvantage particular states, and its structure counters many interstate or
4 26
regional beggar-my-neighbor actions.
Advocates of extended judicial review target federal regulations and

taxes that, in their view, unduly restrict national markets directly rather
than by authorizing interstate parochialism. 427 Judicial policing of this
kind can be based only on a substantive preference for unregulated markets; it has no roots in interstate rivalry and nothing to do with the concept of a common market. There is no basis in 1787 constitutional
history for such a value, and the Court's prior attempt to find it in the

fourteenth amendment has been soundly criticized.428 It should not now
be revived under cover of the commerce clause or under the privileges
and immunities clause. 429
425 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), the Court said that
Congress could validate state laws existing at the time of its action but not subsequently passed
laws, see id. at 318; see also Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889) (voiding business
licensing law); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (upholding state liquor control
laws). These were directed against prospective laws only, based on the strict nondelegation
doctrine that is no longer followed. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7,
§ 4.8, at 149-50.
426 See note 183 and accompanying text supra.
427 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 18, at 152-56; Varat, supra note 246, at 570-71.
428 See, e.g., J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7, § 4.9, at 154-56.
429 Professor Eule advocates shifting the locus of the dormant commerce power doctrine to
the privileges and immunities clause, which prohibits some state laws that discriminate against
citizens of other states. See Eule, supra note 18, at 446-55. As he acknowledges, this would
require extensive revision of existing privileges and immunities clause law. Id. Professor
Black had earlier advocated the same thing. See Black, Perspectives on the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism and Interstate Commerce 59 (A.D. Tarlock ed. 1981).
Previously, Black had argued that the doctrine should be implied from the structure of the
Constitution as a whole. See C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 2022 (1969). Professors Regan and Sedler also advocate this view. See Regan, supra note 18, at
1110-25; Sedler, supra note 18, at 887-90, 991-99.
The structural argument is plausible as an original reading of text and history. The privileges and immunities theory depends on whether one reads that clause as a guarantee of personal rights, as Professor Eule does, or as an adjustment of federalism to limit interstate
rivalry. The former reading raises the problems discussed in the text. Under the latter, which
is more consistent with the original history of the Constitution, that clause would also be a
plausible locus for the dormant commerce power doctrine. But neither it nor the structural
argument is superior to the Court's existing doctrine, so values of repose and continuity oppose
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D.

ProtectionistIntent

Professor Donald Regan advocates importing the legislative motivation standard from the fourteenth amendment to govern the dormant
commerce power doctrine. He argues that for "movement of goods"
cases, 430 the correct constitutional rule in theory, and the one that the
Court unconsciously follows, is to forbid only purposeful state protectionism. 431 advocates that the Court strike down a law only when pro432
tectionist purpose contributed "substantially" to its passage.
Professor Regan believes that his rule would be "narrower" than what
most of us think is current Court doctrine, and that it would avoid the
4 33
relative evil of balancing.
As explained in Part II, the Court invalidates state laws regulating
or taxing the state's imports and exports, only when they are protectionist, that is, when these laws categorically favor local interests over their
external competitors. 434 But in cases involving commerce in transit or
transactions outside the legislating state, partially protectionist or non4 35
protectionist laws can be invalid based on multiple or conflict burdens.
Hence, application of Professor Regan's rule to the movement of goods
through a state or between external points would radically alter the doctrine by requiring a decision based solely on protectionist intent.
Applied to import-export cases, Regan's theory more closely corresponds in outcome with the Court's doctrine, and most of the cases he
discusses are in the import-export category. 436 For these cases, the question he raises is whether protectionist intent should be the controlling
indicium of protectionism.
There are two differences between Court opinions and Professor Regan's test. The Court expressly relies on balancing, 437 and Professor Rea switch.
430 Professor Regan defines "movement of goods" cases as "all dormant commerce clause
cases except: (1) cases involving state regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate transportation, such as railroads or trucking; (2) cases involving state taxation of interstate commerce;
and (3) cases involving the state as market participant.... ." Regan, supra note 18, at 1098-99.
431 See Regan, supra note 18, at 1093, 1098-99, 1110-60, 1284-87; see also Farber, supra
note 18, at 400-06 (advocating that, for regulations, dormant commerce power doctrine be
confined to cases of intentional discrimination against interstate commerce). These articles
advocate very different approaches. Professor Regan is generally satisfied with what the Court
does and favors only a change in articulated grounds. Professor Farber urges a revision that,
in his own word, is "radical." Id. at 404.
432 See Regan, supra note 18, at 1148. Regan expressly omits taxes and transportation from
his rule, very much narrowing its scope, although he occasionally pulls cases from these fields
into his analysis. See id. at 1092-93, 1098-1101, 1174, 1182-92, 1243-44.
433 See id. at 1283.
434 See text accompanying notes 189-91 supra.
435 See text accompanying notes 247-49, 270-331 supra.
436 See note 430 supra.
437 See Regan, supra note 18, at 1105, 1221.
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gan condemns balancing in movement-of-goods cases. 4 38 Second, Regan
advocates relying on protectionist intent or motive as distinct from effects or results. His express reliance on the equal protection test for racial or similar discrimination clearly demonstrates his emphasis on
separate proof of intent.4 39 By contrast, the Court has said that it need
not decide whether protectionism or discrimination was deliberate."40
Most of its opinions, and its governing tests, say nothing about intent.
The Court need not discuss or rely on intent because almost all of
the import-export laws that the Court strikes down as protectionist discriminate categorically against interstate or foreign commerce. Such
rules have categorically protectionist effects, and it is usually obvious
that protectionism was intended. In these cases, an independent finding
of intent would not change outcomes; it would simply insult state legislatures gratuitously.
An intent standard could make a difference when partially discriminatory laws are attacked as protectionist, or when categorically discriminatory rules are seriously defended, as in quarantine cases. Under
existing precedents, partially discriminatory laws that burden only imports or exports are struck down very rarely. A challenger must show
substantially protectionist effects. States defend these laws based on legitimate (nonprotectionist) purposes. The Court sustains the laws unless
their practical impact is very close to categorical discrimination and their
justification is weak. The test is deferential to states; most laws are
sustained. 44 1
A rule that depends on intent independent of effects, and that precludes balancing would surely invalidate more state laws than the existing doctrine. It would broadly apply to partial discrimination in
import-export commerce and to most movement-of-goods cases involving multiple and conflict burdens because most of these generate some
protectionist effects. Partially discriminatory laws that reasonably carry
out legitimate purposes would also be struck down when a challenger
persuades a court that protectionist intent contributed substantially to
passage. Current doctrine routinely sustains this type of legislation; Regan's rule would not.
438 See id. at 1174-82.
439 See id. at 1143 n.87.
440 See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977)
("[We need not ascribe an economic protectionist motive to the North Carolina Legislature to
resolve this case.. . ."). Regan argues extensively that this statement does not mean what it
says. See Regan, supra note 18, at 1221-28; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
145-46 (1970) (finding intent irrelevant); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373
U.S. 64, 72 (1963) (acknowledging that state tax law at issue may have discriminated accidentally but striking law down anyway).
441 See text accompanying notes 221-46 supra.
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Professor Regan's discussion offers several illustrations among recent cases won by states." 2 He claims that the challenged laws were
sustained based on lack of proof of protectionist motive. 4 3 However,
innocent motive clearly was not a controlling factor in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.444 because the law was sustained despite an ex-

plicit trial court finding of protectionist purpose. 44 5 In Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland,44 6 the Court similarly upheld a statute, even
though protectionist purpose likely played a role in its enactment. 447 Regan argues that if protectionist intent had been proved, the laws ought to
have been struck down. 44 8 His test is excessively instrusive into an area
442

See Regan, supra note 18, at 1233-43.

443 See id.
444 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
445 449 U.S. at 474-77 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The trial court
struck down the law based on both the commerce clause and the equal protection clause,
finding that the state legislature had intended to favor local paper producers over outside plastics producers. See id. at 474-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is
the sort of finding that Regan would make determinative. The Supreme Court reversed in the
face of the finding.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion said that protectionism may be shown by proof of
either "discriminatory effect" or "discriminatory purpose." 449 U.S. at 471 n.15. He did not
indicate what measure of effect or purpose he would use. But we know from a number of other
opinions that Justice Brennan and, perhaps, Justice Marshall have an enthusiasm for actual
legislative motive review that is not shared by other members of the Court. See Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 681-85 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
704-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The opinions in Kassel are particularly misleading because
they speak in terms of protectionism in a case that was not a protectionism case. See note 300
and accompanying text supra. Moreover, whatever his views on the equal protection clause,
Justice Brennan's disposition in Clover Leaf belies an interest in motive review under the dormant commerce power doctrine.
446 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
447 See id. at 140-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In general,
protectionist intent is more common than Regan assumes. He wants to validate based on a
"hypothetical innocent legislature" test. Regan, supra note 18, at 1155. This seems to be a
standard of purity both rare and adventitious in the real world of politics.
Another case in which Regan would invalidate when a court did not was Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177 (Colo. 1984). The state had enacted a statute reducing by
five cents its motor fuel exise tax on gasohol manufactured in Colorado. See id. at 180. This
law was patently invalid. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn.
1982) (invalidating similar statute). Warned by the Minnesota case, the Colorado legislature
repealed its law and replaced it with a like reduction for gasohol made at small facilities
whether located in Colorado or out of state. See Archer Daniels, 690 P.2d at 180. The effect
was to continue the tax incentive for all existing Colorado producers but deny it to the plaintiff, a large out-of-state firm. The state court required proof of protectionist purpose to make
out a commerce clause violation, and the majority stubbornly held that purpose had not been
proved. Id. at 184. Although protectionist intent seems obvious, the court's result was not
clearly wrong. Tax incentives for small businesses are a legitimate state purpose well served by
the revised statute. Moreover, market adjustments are effective; the statute disadvantages any
future large producer in the state and aids any small ones outside it. See text accompanying
notes 169-70, 225-34 supra.
448 See Regan, supra note 18, at 1096, 1235, 1235 n.324.
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where legitimate state interest is strong, and market corrections are effective.44 9 It is unlikely that the Court will adopt the test for general use. It
has rejected a clear chance to do so, adhering instead to its traditional
4 50
reliance on state justification.
The intent issue is cloudier when a state seriously attempts to justify
categorical discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce. Many
quarantine laws facially discriminate against interstate commerce and
have overtly protectionist effects but are sustained by the Court. In
Maine v. Taylor,4 51 the Court's opinion first assessed the state's justification.452 The Court added that to sustain categorical discrimination, a
state must also show that its legitimate purpose cannot be achieved by
nondiscriminatory means. 453 It did not require an absence of protectionist intent. But later the Court responded to the plaintiff's arguments
about protectionism in terms that were ambiguous about intent.4 54 The
4 55
opinion might implicitly support Regan's test.
The Court should not take the bait. Only the most innocent or
mindless legislator could be unaware of the protectionist effects of a
quarantine law. Thus, the validity of these laws would turn on whether
449 See text accompanying notes 145-47, 168-73 supra.
450 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). Professor Regan's
article was cited in Justice Powell's majority opinion to support the statement that "the principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce." Id. at 1648. Given the historical importance of the allocation and
uniformity norms of the doctrine, this statement was misleading. The majority opinion determined that the Indiana antitakeover law did not discriminate, based upon the traditional standard of categorical discrimination against interstate commerce. See id. at 1648-49. In
applying the doctrine, the Court ignored the argument that the law was intended to protect
jobs of local managers and workers and the tax base of local communities threatened by corporate takeovers. The dissent would have overturned the law based on both protectionism and
interference in external transactions, but it did not rely on Regan's theory. See id. at 1655-56
(White, J., dissenting).
451 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
452 See id. at 140-51.
453 See id.

454 See id. at 148-50. In this passage, the Court rejected the finding of protectionist intent
relied on by the court of appeals to overturn the statute, and it decided that the state's legitimate purpose was not "merely a sham or a 'post hoc rationalization.'" Id. at 149 (quoting
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 n.20 (1979)). But it did not endorse a separate, substantial intent standard.
455 Older quarantine opinions were written in the summary style formerly predominant and
provide little guidance. In Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933), Justice Butler's opinion
rejected the dormant commerce power argument in three terse sentences. See id. at 349-50.
These included the statement that the order at issue "[u]ndoubtedly... was promulgated in
good faith and is appropriate for the prevention of further spread of the disease among dairy
cattle and to safeguard public health." Id. at 349-50. In Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137
(1902), Justice Harlan said that as the state's means "do not appear upon their face to be
unreasonable, we must, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, assume that they are
appropriate to the object which the State is entitled to accomplish." Id. at 152.
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states can convince courts that such obvious effects were not substantially intended. 456 Because protectionist and quarantine effects are often
identical, the test would sometimes turn entirely on the legislature's subjective motive. Instead, the controlling standard should be the factual
necessity for discrimination to serve a legitimate quarantine purpose.
This exception to the antidiscrimination rule ought to be strict, lest the
exception swallow the rule. But it will produce greater predictability
than a legislative intent standard. Legitimate quarantines are better
characterized as justifed protectionism than as nonprotectionist.
Professor Regan's intent standard applies the principles of modem
equal protection law to commercial discrimination. Under equal protection doctrine, any amount of deliberate discrimination against suspect
classes is branded a constitutional wrong. Purposeful racial discrimination can be proved by disparate effects when a law does not substantially
achieve any legitimate purpose. 457 But a law that does substantially
achieve a legitimate state purpose is nevertheless invalid if racial animus
458
aided its passage.
The constitutional policy underlying the equal protection doctrine
is, however, fundamentally different from that underlying the dormant
commerce power doctrine. Racial discrimination is a nearly absolute
wrong for governments at any level, tolerated only for remedial purposes.45 9 Protectionism, by contrast, is forbidden only to the states; the
federal government often pursues protectionist policies in foreign trade
and consents to some protectionism by states. 460 States may also pursue
protectionist policies when they act as market participants. 46 1 Moreover,
protectionism is simply a particular way that state governments aid their
people-the fundamental obligation of all governments and an essential
element of a federal system. Protectionism rather strictly defined is condemned because harm to other states and to the nation clearly outweighs
local benefit, and states can achieve any legitimate aim without it. But
other forms of parochialism, including discrimination in favor of products that happen to be local, are sustained as integral to state autonomy
462
and even useful to interstate competition.
The Court's implicit definition of protectionist intent is simply the
456 Cf. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (veterans' preference law
was not intended to discriminate against women); id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing view that veterans' preference evinces purposeful gender-based discrimination).
457 E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 362-63 (1886).
458 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985).
459 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
460 See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra.
461 See text accompanying notes 332-58 supra.
462 See text accompanying notes 225-30 supra.
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common law notion of intending the natural and probable results of one's
actions. The doctrine's concern is essentially with prospective burdens
on commerce. What matters is whether the enforcement of a law is protectionist, not whether it was wrong to pass it in the first place. 463 Even
when a law was passed for innocent reasons, once the state knows of
protectionist effects, continued enforcement is intentional to the extent
relevant to dormant commerce power analysis. As Justice Cardozo suggested in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,64 protectionist effects should be
465
assumed to be intended.
Professor Regan's betes noires are misguided judges and academics
known as "balancers." '46 6 However, his own thesis relies on balancing to
derive his constitutional rule that condemns deliberate state protectionism. 4 67 His criticism of balancers refers only to balancing tests that
weigh competing factors in every case. In other words, he disapproves of
but accepts and applies
what Professor Henkin called ad hoe balancing,
4 68
what Henkin termed definitional balancing.
Regan may have the problem backward. If Congress were to pass a
statute authorizing courts to strike down laws with substantially protectionist effects that do not reasonably serve a nonprotectionist purpose, we
would not criticize the courts for making decisions on an ad hoc, case-bycase basis. The controversial aspect of the dormant commerce power
doctrine is that the Supreme Court created this standard with no more
guidance from Congress than silence. Some critics claim that ad hoc
469
balancing produces inconsistent or otherwise unsatisfactory results.
Of course, that problem often can be cured by judicial tinkering, by developing clearer rules. The basic constitutional choice to restrict protectionism and multiple and conflict burdens on interstate commerce, which
463 This statement assumes, as I have argued elsewhere in this Article, that the basic purpose of the dormant commerce power doctrine is interstate commercial harmony, not personal
rights for out-of-state merchants. See text accompanying notes 61-84 supra.
464 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
465 See id. at 522 ("[T]he avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.").
466 See Regan, supra note 18, at 1207-09.
467 See id. at 1110-25. Regan does rely on one erroneous argument. He says that protectionist tariffs transfer welfare from outside producers to their local counterparts. Id. at 1118.
As explained previously, however, long-run tariff costs are predominantly borne by consumers
in the imposing state. See text accompanying notes 165-67, 176-77 supra.

468 See Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1022,
1028-37 (1978).
469 See, e.g., id. at 1048-49 (pointing to dangers allegedly inherent in ad hoc balancing);
Anson & Shenkkan, supra note 14, at 81-85 (arguing that because of difficulties associated with
ad hoc balancing, Congress, not courts, should decide when to override state regulations);
Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 47, 58-64, 89 (arguing that ad hoc balancing has failed to produce consistent results).
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lies at the heart of most academic criticism of the dormant commerce
power doctrine, was made by definitional balancing. It is not an ad hoc
standard.
Indeed, Professor Regan's test may be more ad hoc than the Court's
because it requires findings of fact about actual legislative intent in each
case. The Court's test, on the other hand, depends on evaluation of the
state's justifying purpose, and this is what Regan finds objectionably ad
hoc. But under the Court's current test, results can be predicted because
the Court's concept of sufficient justification can be derived from decided
cases. Relying on proof of protectionist intent, as Regan proposes, would
likely produce more surprises.
In general, when opposing constitutional or other legal policies and
their relation to one another are agreed upon and well defined, we should
not be troubled that courts decide which value predominates in specific
contexts. We accept that the judicial function extends to matters of degree. 470 Disagreements begin when courts arguably use balancing tests
to create new constitutional rights, to construct elaborately formal constitutional rules, 47 1 to mask true grounds of decision, to reach decisions
that do not seem empirically consistent, or to exercise what critics believe
is excessive discretion.
Several of these objections have been raised about dormant commerce power rules. The most frequent criticism has been that the doctrine reaches inconsistent results. The Court has openly said that it
balances national interests against state autonomy, and it usually describes the national interest as "free trade," an imprecise and mildly misleading term. In fact, the basic national interest is interstate commercial
harmony. In import-export cases, this interest is adequately served by
forbidding protectionism, as Professor Regan demonstrates. The protectionism inquiry involves narrowly focused balancing.
In external market and commerce in transit cases, protectionist,
multiple, and conflict burdens are weighed against state autonomy. The
Court assesses the nature of the burden and the state's interest according
to established categories and criteria. 472 This balancing is far from the
rudderless vessel many critics assume. The argument that the Court has
been inconsistent has some force, but the issue is much too difficult for
470 See Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J.,
concurring in part); Levmore, supra note 161, at 574.
It is hard to improve on Holmes' often-quoted articulation: "The boundary at which the
conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but
points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case
falls on the nearer or farther side." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355

(1908).
471 See Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 203 (1985).
472 See text accompanying notes 247-331 supra.
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summary conclusion. Significantly, the Court continues to follow Justice
Miller's 1869 articulation of the doctrine, 473 Justice Strong's 1873 opinionS,4 7 4 and Justice Curtis' 1851 effort in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.475
That is more consistency than we have in many other areas of constitutional law.
IV
ARE GAINS WORTH LITIGATION COSTS?

Professor Kitch argues that the dormant commerce power doctrine
should be abandoned because it is less efficient than the "inter-sovereign"
remedy of relying on negotiations between states to overcome trade barriers. 476 The record in international markets, however, casts doubt on the
efficacy of political bargaining as an effective way to achieve free trade.
Protectionist politics, high transaction costs when politicians are bargainers, free rider problems, and great political temptations to burden outsid-7
47
ers have impeded trade agreements throughout recorded history.
Much political bargaining is impaired by the bilateral monopoly problem.4 78 The European Economic Community is the most promising
modem attempt to meet these problems systematically. But it has turned
to mechanisms that resemble the Supreme Court's dormant commerce
power doctrine, which Kitch would eschew. 4 79
Professor Kitch suggests two answers to objections based on the unsatisfactory history of international trade. One is simply the assertion
that the greater affinity among American states than among foreign nations would make negotiated solutions to trade barriers more common
domestically. 480 Kitch is probably right about the greater facility of
trade negotiations in a federal system; but it does not follow that his
regime would be more effective than judicial supervision. The numerous
protectionist and exploitative laws that have emerged from state legislatures show that potential trade barriers are significant. It is guesswork at
best to suppose that these differences would be effectively overcome by
negotiations and agreements among states. Indeed, other federal systems
473 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).
474 Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873); State Tax on Ry. Gross
Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1873).
475 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
476 See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 13-14, 20-21, 52 n.35.
477 See, e.g., M. Kreinin, supra note 171, at 270, 306.
478 See R. Posner, supra note 134, at 600.
479 See Wigenbaur, Elimination of Discriminatory State Taxation in Intra-Community
Trade: The Contribution of the European Court of Justice, in 2 Courts and Free Markets 480
(1980).
480 See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 13-14, 37, 46.
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have not seen fit to try Kitch's solution.481
Professor Kitch also argues that the dormant commerce power doctrine has the insidious effect of inducing Congress to enact heavy-handed
federal regulation that is worse than the state laws it replaces. He claims
that the Interstate Commerce Act and federal dairy regulations were induced by the Court's disabling of state regulations. 482 The observation

that judicial intervention may inspire congressional action has been made
by others, and it has some empirical support. 4 83 Market competition al-

most always generates political pressures for protection.
Kitch believes that federal regulation is an absolute evil-an assumption that many persons would dispute. He also gives insufficient
weight to the direct political support for statutes like the Interstate Commerce Act. 484 At least some of the federal laws that Kitch does not like
would have been enacted regardless of judicial disabling of state regulation. Moreover, federal regulation has at times appeared to result from

an excess of state regulation rather than from a void created by judicial
invalidation. For example, banking has been subject to comprehensive
federal regulation, although the Court had not been policing state regula-

tion. Arguably, the incentive for federal regulation was too much state
power rather than too little. 48 5 The Court's failure to forbid discrimina486
tory regulation of intrastate railroad rates led to federal regulation.
Also, the dormant commerce power doctrine has been more important in
policing state taxes than regulations, and there is no evidence that invali4 87
dation of state taxes has generated anticompetitive federal actions.
See notes 498-99 and accompanying text infra.
482 See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 46, 123.
483 See, e.g., P. Dempsey & W. Thorns, Law and Economic Regulation In Transportation
11, 17 (1986) (claiming that Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), was prompted by Supreme Court decisions); cf.
Easterbrook, supra note 118, at 41 & n.40 (asserting that dormant commerce power doctrine
contributed to passage of Sherman Act, ch. 467, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). Moreover, congressional efforts to regulate the insurance industry
failed in part because the Court had refused to subject insurance to the dormant commerce
power. See M. Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 1885-1910, at 240-42 (1963).
484 See P. Dempsey & W. Thorns, supra note 483, at 11 (stating that even before Wabash,
St. L. & R. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), "Congress had passed two bills [imposing]
constraints upon the rail industry"). Kitch acknowleges this. See Kitch, Regulation, supra
note 14, at 123.
485 See Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 Banking L.J. 483, 491-92 (1971).
486 Compare The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (affirming Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of intrastate rates) with The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S.
352, 412-17 (1913) (holding intrastate rates subject to state authority).
487 Recent reductions in the judicially imposed limits on state taxing powers have provoked
Congress into enacting several statutory limits on state taxes. See note 275 and accompanying
text supra. If the Court were to abdicate its role completely, there would still be some industry
pressures on Congress to enact more limitations. But these laws would not suppress competi481
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The benefit Kitch seeks is assumed economic gains from increased
competition among states to attract and keep investments. He uses the
example of competition among states in the formulation of business corporation acts to support his theory.4 88 But as explained in Part II, the
dormant commerce power doctrine improves the effectiveness of interstate competition (so long as there is no comprehensive federal preemption).489 It is unlikely that competition among business corporation acts
would have succeeded so well without judicial protection of foreign corporations from parochial state legislation. 490 Moreover, in the field of
state taxation, there has been extensive interstate cooperation to implement the tax allocation rules imposed by the Court. 491 These efforts
avoid tariff-like barriers and promote interstate competition.
These objections aside, Professor Kitch asks an important question.
The dormant commerce power doctrine and its preemption counterpart
have significant public and private litigation costs that should be outweighed by political and economic gains from greater economic union.
Some challenges to state commercial laws take years to work their way
through the courts. Important state taxes have been held hostage by the
process. 4 92 Even if gains justified costs in the past, changing conditions
may have altered the balance. It is reasonable to suppose that market
substitutions have become a more effective deterrent to state parochialism than ever before. This allows the Court to leave adjustments to the
49 3
marketplace.
In sum, Professor Kitch's preference for intersovereign trade bargaining seems hopelessly utopian in light of the history of international
commerce. But the Court should carefully consider the costs of judicial
supervision in determining the scope of the doctrine.
CONCLUSION

It is fashionable to suggest that the dormant commerce power doctrine is not worth its costs because modem cases are about relatively minor matters such as train car lengths and mudflaps. This description of
modem cases has force, at least for cases about regulations, if not taxes.
tion; they might improve it.

488 See Kitch, Regulation, supra note 14, at 46.
489 See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
490 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Conard, Federal Protection of
the Free Movement of Corporations, in 2 Courts and Free Markets 363, 370-73 (1982).
491 See 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 495-616 (describing applications of Multistate
Tax Commission regulations and Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act).
492 See Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10 Stan. L. Rev.
274, 291 (1958). The importance of this factor depends in part on the courts' view of the issue
of retroactive remedies. See note 416 and accompanying text supra.
493 See text accompanying notes 172-77 supra.
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But current cases are partly a product of the doctrine's past impact on
state legislation. The doctrine's most important effect has been on state
tax codes, which are designed around the Court's rules. Today's codes
apportion interstate taxes, impose few tariff-like measures, do not tax
goods in transit, and do not single out transportation for heavy exactions.
There is at least some connection between the modem tax codes and a
century of judicial supervision. The doctrine may have also contributed
to the interstate mobility of corporations, and has shielded a national
transportation network against constricting state laws.
On the other hand, these claimed successes of the doctrine have not
been conclusively proved. Possibly, little would be different without judicial involvement. 494 Perhaps Congress would have done a better job absent judicial involvement. Perhaps interstate bargains would have
achieved more. But, the burden of persuasion ought to rest on those
advocating change. The most powerful argument against the Court jettisoning the dormant commerce power doctrine is the value of continuity
and repose. The doctrine has been enforced for more than a century; its
preemption companion has been with us longer than that. Both are subject to popular revision by Congress, which has impliedly demonstrated
its support for the Court's decisions. These are persuasive reasons to
require a strong case against the current doctrine from those who would
495
change or eliminate judicial pursuit of economic union.
This burden has not been met by popular outcry. Political opposi494 The insurance industry has been continuously exempt from the dormant commerce
power doctrine, so it provides one basis for comparison. See note 107 supra. It is heavily
regulated by states, often in ways that would otherwise violate the doctrine. Yet, interstate
insurance business has not been shut out.
The insurance industry is not the best measure of the doctrine's importance to interstate
commerce, however. Unlike other industries, it does not depend on the movement of goods;
shipments of policies can be done by mail, which is beyond the reach of state laws. Most
disputes between states and the insurance industry have been about resident agents, over
whom states would have considerable jurisdiction anyway. In addition, the Court has not left
insurance regulation entirely to the states; it has imposed particularly vigorous equal protection standards. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Fidelity Deposit
Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1920); 1 J. Hellerstein, supra note 145, at 64-73.
495 Critics whose concern is state autonomy have a less drastic remedy than abolition of the
doctrine, which is illustrated by Chief Justice Rehnquist's votes. He has voted to invalidate
state laws only when the Court was unanimous, and a few times he has dissented alone. See,
e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 646 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Japan Line
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 457 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Allenberg
Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Yet, Rehnquist has not called for repudiation of the doctrine. He appears to recognize the
values it serves, but he gives greater weight to the competing value of state autonomy, particularly in the special field of natural resources cases. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 961 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ground water); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (minnows); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (solid waste disposal).
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tion to the doctrine is nonexistent. The battle is confined to the academic/judicial complex. This doubtless explains the failure of academic
critics to suggest that Congress, rather than the Court, change or abolish
the doctrine. 49 6 A statutory change, by contrast to judicially imposed
revisions, would allow taking of evidence, careful review in advance,
drawing of more pragmatic lines, and use of economic experts. Scholars
who believe that a great change is needed might turn their talents to
497
drafting a statute to realize their visions.
Another reason for caution in revising the dormant commerce
power doctrine is its relationship to preemption doctrine. As numerous
observers have pointed out, preemption rules closely parallel dormant
commerce power doctrine in the many cases in which a federal statute
regulates to the same end as a state law but does not command invalidation of the state law. Radical revision of the dormant commerce power
doctrine would presumably require reexamination of preemption doctrine as well. If judicial invalidation is entirely illegitimate when Congress has said nothing, it is hard to see why it is entirely legitimate when
Congress has said something about the subject but nothing to command
the states. Moreover, existing preemption law achieves some efficiencies
by limiting the instances when commerce is subject to two sets of regulations rather than one. If preemption were confined to the rare cases in
which Congress expressly commands that state commercial laws be
struck down, multiple regulation might increase markedly. Adjustment
of this area ought to be initiated by Congress rather than the Court.
In Canada and Australia, the judiciary supervises national common
markets that are quite similar to ours. 498 This is not surprising because
496 Some commentators have proposed that Congress substitute a federal administrative

agency for the Court. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 18, at 407-10; Freund, Judicial Review and
Federalism, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 86, 100-95 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (taxation
only); Kurland, supra note 492, at 291-92. While advocates state obvious reasons in favor of
this proposal, potential difficulties, including agency competence, influence of lobbyists, and
extra layers of judicial review of agency action, warrant careful review. See Freund, supra note
255, at 571-72.
On occasion, members of the Court have stated the view that more congressional regulation would be desirable in the tax field. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,
279-80 (1978) (tax apportionment rules); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (only Congress can thoroughly
investigate the problem of state taxing power and its necessary limits).
497 Relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome show us what one kind of statute might look
like. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3; Stein, An American Lawyer Views European Economic Integration-An Introduction, in 1 American Enterprise in the European Common Market: A Legal Profile 1 (1960).
498 See R. Johnston, The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal-State Relations in Australia,
Canada, and the United States 216, 275, 279 (1969); V. MacKinnon, Comparative Federalism
3-8 (1964).
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our docirines influenced theirs.499 Their voluntary adoption of similar
schemes, following careful deliberation, suggests that our method serves
a general need of federal systems. The European Common Market is the
newest attempt to achieve economic integration across sovereign boundaries. It too has adopted judicial supervision as a primary control. All
four systems have much in common. 5o0
A persuasive case for the doctrine's contraction or retraction must
rest instead on a showing that interference with state autonomy costs
more than the doctrine achieves. This is in part an economic proposition
that has not been proved. It is in part a political judgment that is reflected in Court appointments and in congressional politics. But a legal
rule that was as compatible with Coolidge as with Roosevelt has little to
do with important allocations of power between Washington, D.C., and
the states. The essential policy question is whether the Court's promotion of the framers' goal of economic union achieves net political and
economic gains. After a century and a half of practical experience, our
governmental institutions assume that it does. Academic challengers
have not yet made a contrary case.
499 See R. Johnston, supra note 498, at 233-24, 239, 252-53, 263.
500 See id.; V. MacKinnon, supra note 498, at 111.
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